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INTRODUCTION 
The recent financial crisis fostered lively debates about 
fundamental issues in financial law and regulation, with many 
commentators blaming the crisis on animal spirits and the irrationality of 
investors.1   Such sentiments are supported by behavioral economics, 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. See GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN 
PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 
ix (2009).  This view follows the famous saying, attributed to J.M. Keynes, that the 
markets are moved by animal spirits, and not by reason.  The original quotation is 
somewhat less eloquent: 
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which challenges standard economic assumptions about rational human 
behavior. 2   From a legal and regulatory viewpoint, the ordinary 
perception is that neoclassical economics emphasizes the importance of 
competition, whereas the behavioral paradigm strengthens the case for 
paternalist and interventionist policies, as it highlights the limits of 
human rationality and willpower.3 
The debate on behavioral law and economics has often led to a 
simplistic division in which proponents of the behavioral paradigm 
advance pro-regulation arguments while advocates of the neoclassical 
paradigm make anti-regulation critiques.4  Critics of the interventionist 
tendencies of behavioral law and economics have also sought to point 
out the theoretical and empirical weaknesses of the behavioral apparatus 
                                                                                                                                         
Even apart from the instability due to speculation, there is the instability due to the 
characteristic of human nature that a large proportion of our positive activities depend 
on spontaneous optimism rather than on a mathematical expectation, whether moral or 
hedonistic or economic.  Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, 
the full consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be 
taken as the result of animal spirits — of a spontaneous urge to action rather than 
inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits 
multiplied by quantitative probabilities. 
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND 
MONEY 161–62 (1936). 
 2. See generally ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (Colin F. Camerer et al. 
eds., 2004); ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000); Robert J. Shiller, From Efficient Markets Theory to 
Behavioral Finance, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 83 (2003).  On behavioral law and economics, 
see generally Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral 
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) [hereinafter Jolls et 
al., Behavioral Approach]; Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment 
and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 
1499 (1998). 
 3. See Sabine Frerichs, False Promises? A Sociological Critique of the 
Behavioural Turn in Law and Economics, 34 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 289, 305 tbl.1 (2011) 
(comparing different economic paradigms); see generally Franziska Rischkowsky & 
Thomas Döring, Consumer Policy in a Market Economy: Considerations from the 
Perspective of the Economics of Information, the New Institutional Economics as well 
as Behavioural Economics, 31 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 285 (2008) (discussing the policy 
implications of different paradigms in economics). 
 4. Compare the fiercely pro-regulation Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics 
of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749 (2008), with anti-regulation Richard A. 
Epstein, The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 803 
(2008).  See also Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and 
Market Corrections, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 111 (2006) (admitting that people make 
mistakes, but preferring the neoclassical approach, and arguing that competitive 
markets and the common law are enough to deal with human errors). 
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in its entirety. 5   It may be argued that some of the opposition to 
behavioralism may be motivated by the political implications it has, or 
seems to have.6 
This Article proposes a different perspective.  While accepting 
some of the criticism of behavioral economics, it argues that the 
behavioral paradigm is broadly valid, but it does not imply a 
systematically interventionist policy.  In fact, a number of reasons can 
be found for why behavioralism may have markedly anti-regulatory 
implications.  In other words, there may be good reasons to regulate 
certain financial activities, but the behavioral perspective specifically 
seems to favor light-touch regulations and regulatory simplicity. 
This thesis is based on five arguments.  First, behavioral economics 
does not necessarily imply the need for heavier regulation, but rather 
presents the possibility for novel light-touch regulations that would not 
be possible within the neoclassical, rational-choice economic 
framework.7  The principal forms of light-touch regulation examined 
here are default rules, targeted information disclosure, and cooling-off 
regulations.  While it is not entirely clear whether these light-touch 
regulations result in more or less intervention overall, it is evidently 
possible to replace certain intrusive regulations with lighter ones.8 
Second, it is argued that faulty market perceptions seem to be best 
corrected by market-based solutions.  Behavioral economics implies that 
financial market participants tend to be misled by a range of factors 
about investment prospects, and some commentators have called for the 
establishment of regulatory tools to help “debias” faulty market 
                                                                                                                                         
 5. E.g., Stephen J. Choi & A. C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 
56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2003) (criticizing the theoretical weaknesses of behavioral 
economics). 
 6. E.g., Richard A. Epstein, Richard Epstein on the Dangerous Allure of 
Behavioral Economics: The Relationship Between Physical and Financial Products, 
TRUTH ON MARKET (Dec. 6, 2010), http://truthonthemarket.com/2010/12/06/richard-
epstein-on-the-dangerous-allure-of-behavioral-economics-the-relationship-between-
physical-and-financial-products/ (criticizing plans to regulate consumer finance more 
heavily, and highlighting the interventionist tendencies of behavioralists). 
 7. See Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics 
and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism”, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003) 
(proposing regulations that help less rational actors without imposing major costs on 
more rational actors); see also RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: 
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (Penguin Books rev. 
ed. 2009) (2008). 
 8. See infra Part III. 
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perceptions.9   While such measures seem plausible, the prospects of 
regulatory debiasing in financial markets are not very promising since 
the track record of public authorities in predicting crises is poor, and 
their resources and incentives for doing so are weak in comparison with 
the private sector.10  Some private sector actors already provide plenty of 
high quality debiasing activity, and it seems that it would be better to 
reinforce and harness those activities.11 
Third, increasing regulation does not seem to solve problems 
caused by lack of market discipline, pricing inefficiencies, and financial 
innovation.  In fact, better results may be achieved through simpler rules 
and more freedom.12  This argument covers a wide range of issues that 
go to the heart of financial regulation; the objective is to pinpoint some 
crucial factors in light of behavioral economics. 
Fourth, regulatory rule makers are subject to imperfect rationality, 
which tends to reduce the quality of regulatory intervention.  This has 
led to the pejorative term “behavioral bureaucrats.”13  The analysis here 
is an extension of the widely accepted public choice theory, which 
challenges the assumption of perfect and well-intentioned lawmaking.14  
The findings of behavioral economics reinforce the tendencies identified 
by public-choice theorists, which means that in light of behavioralism, 
one ought to be even more skeptical about the prospects of regulatory 
intervention.15  There are also some possibilities of designing institutions 
to mitigate the harmful effects of human psychology in lawmaking.16 
Fifth, regulatory complexity exacerbates the harmful effects of 
limited rationality; in contrast, simple and stable rules give rise to 
positive learning effects.  Paradoxically, it may even be argued that it is 
good to have some crises from time to time—but they should be 
                                                                                                                                         
 9. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 199 (2006) [hereinafter Jolls & Sunstein, Debiasing] (proposing legal strategies 
to reduce psychological biases). 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
 11. See infra Part IV.B. 
 12. See infra Part V. 
 13. Jolls et al., Behavioral Approach, supra note 2, at 1543. 
 14. On public choice theory, see generally WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., 
BUREAUCRACY AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1996); MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC 
OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (2d ed. 1971); 
GORDON TULLOCK, THE ECONOMICS OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGE AND RENT SEEKING (1989); 
Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. 
REV. 291 (1974). 
 15. See infra Part VI. 
 16. See infra Part VI.C. 
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relatively frequent and small in magnitude.17  In terms of institutional 
solutions, this implies that the rules should not be excessively protective 
of investors, and that decentralized regulation has advantages not 
acknowledged by traditional theories of regulation.18 
The rest of the Article is structured as follows.  Part I outlines the 
behavioral approach and discusses critically its implications in the 
context of financial markets.  Part II shows that it may be possible to 
mitigate the effect of certain behavioral imperfections through light-
touch regulation in the contractual context.  Part III examines whether 
mistaken investor perceptions might be improved in non-contractual 
ways and whether such a task should be given to the regulatory 
authorities.  Part IV analyzes a range of issues related to behavioral 
economics—market discipline, pricing efficiency, and financial 
innovation—and draws out their regulatory implications.  Part V notes 
the implications of behavioral theory for regulators and politicians and 
argues that behavioralism should lead us to be more skeptical about the 
benefits of regulatory intervention.  Part VI makes the case for legal and 
regulatory simplicity due to its positive learning effects. 
 
I. FINANCIAL MARKETS AND BEHAVIORAL  
ECONOMICS: AN OVERVIEW 
 
At its essence, behavioral economics is a paradigm that applies 
experimental psychology to economic theory, highlighting departures 
from standard assumptions of rational choice.19   It does not seek to 
understand the psychology of human behavior in all its depth, but rather 
looks for regularities that can be incorporated into economic models in 
order to make those models more realistic.20  One way of presenting 
behavioral economics is to divide the experimental findings into three 
categories: bounded rationality (people have limited cognitive powers), 
bounded willpower (people often fail to choose the options that they 
themselves would consider best) and bounded self-interest (people care 
                                                                                                                                         
 17. See infra Part VII.A. 
 18. See infra Part VII.B. 
 19. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 20. The regularity aspect is important because behavioral economics cannot build 
on chaos and irrationality. It highlights departures from the predictions of mainstream 
economic models, but departures that are in some way systematic and therefore 
predictable. 
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about fairness and the wellbeing of others).21  The present discussion 
focuses on bounded rationality and bounded willpower because these 
theories imply that people tend to make systematically suboptimal 
choices. On the other hand, bounded self-interest will actually be 
beneficial for the functioning of markets and societies.22 
 
A. BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND WILLPOWER:  
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 
1. Bounded Rationality 
Bounded rationality refers to the fact that real human persons do 
not have infinite and perfect cognitive processing capacity; therefore 
they do not always make optimal choices.23  Not only is it costly and 
sometimes difficult to access relevant information (which is 
incorporated in economic models of asymmetric information), but it is 
also costly, time-consuming, and difficult to process whatever 
information is available.24  In a world of complex decisions and large 
                                                                                                                                         
 21. See Jolls et al., Behavioral Approach, supra note 2 (using the three-part 
distinction); see also Bruno S. Frey & Matthias Benz, From Imperialism to Inspiration: 
A Survey of Economics and Psychology, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO ECONOMICS AND 
PHILOSOPHY 61 (John B. Davis et al. eds., 2004) (adopting a similar distinction, with 
the addition of happiness research). 
 22. On the benefits of bounded self-interest or fairness behavior, see ROBERT H. 
FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS (1988); 
Robert H. Frank, If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would 
He Want One with a Conscience?, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 593 (1987); Matthew Rabin, 
Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281 
(1993). The phenomenon of fairness behavior, and other departures from narrow self-
interest, may of course have great relevance for the design of optimal financial 
regulation. 
 23. This idea was first systematically developed by HERBERT A. SIMON, 
ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN 
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS (1947); Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of 
Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955).  See John Conlisk, Why Bounded 
Rationality?, 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 669 (1996), for an extensive literature review. 
Note that there are important differences among the authors in this field: Simon’s 
contributions focused on the costs of information processing, and the emphasis was on 
choice involving complex data.  The more recent behavioral economics literature 
attempts to create a more universal account of departures from mainstream economic 
theory. 
 24. See SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR, supra note 23; Simon, Rational 
Choice, supra note 23; Conlisk, supra note 23. 
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amounts of relevant data, bounded rationality implies that people often 
make choices that are suboptimal relative to some ideal world—and to 
standard economic models.25 
In order to reduce the costliness of information processing, people 
resort to what cognitive psychology calls heuristics.26  Heuristic “rules 
of thumb” are mental devices that help to simplify cognitive tasks; 
however, the result of heuristics is often at odds with the ideal 
decision.27  For example, people find it very difficult to estimate risks 
and probabilities accurately.  This can be partly explained by the 
availability heuristic, which relies on intuitive impressions of what can 
more easily be called to mind. 28   Thus, most people give more 
consideration to risks of which they have a vivid mental image. 29  
Probability judgments also rely on reference or “anchor” values, which 
are used as a basis for adjustments in different circumstances; the 
anchoring heuristic often helps to make more reasonable estimates of 
probabilities, but the final estimate significantly depends on the choice 
of initial value.30 
Imperfect cognitive powers and the reliance on heuristics tend to 
give rise to behavioral biases—sometimes called anomalies—such as 
choices that systematically depart from the predictions of standard 
rational choice models.31  The magnitude of departure varies depending 
on many factors, but the general direction of the biases is quite 
universal.  Here is a summary of some of the most significant biases. 
                                                                                                                                         
 25. See SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR, supra note 23; Simon, Rational 
Choice, supra note 23; Conlisk, supra note 23.  
 26. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124 (1974) (providing a seminal 
contribution on heuristics), reprinted in Introduction to JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos 
Tversky eds., 1982). 
 27. See id. at 1129. 
 28. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging 
Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973) (providing a seminal 
contribution on the availability heuristic), reprinted in JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 164 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos 
Tversky eds., 1982). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 11, 26, 
29 (1998). 
 31. See Tversky, supra note 26, at 1124. 
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Salience and related biases.  People tend to give relatively too 
much importance to salient, memorable, and vivid evidence, even at the 
expense of weightier, more rational evidence to the contrary.32  This 
explains many phenomena in financial markets.  For example, people 
tend to underestimate the probability of a future crisis, although in light 
of economic history, financial crises are quite common.33  It also implies 
that people tend to overreact to noticeable but isolated events, such as 
fiascos in individual companies. 
Optimism bias and overconfidence.  Most people tend to 
overestimate their chances of success and to underestimate chances of 
failure and risk.34  This means, for example, that people tend to assume 
that they are somehow more immune to risks that they consider likely to 
happen to other people.35  Optimism has its benefits, but it also implies 
that people often fail to take prudent precautions against predictable 
uncertainties.36  A related bias is overconfidence, which means that most 
people overestimate their ability to judge facts and circumstances; 
interestingly, expertise and past successes seem to exacerbate 
overconfidence.37 
Hindsight and confirmation bias.  When assessing future 
probabilities, people tend to give too much weight to events that already 
took place, assuming that what happened was nearly inevitable even if it 
                                                                                                                                         
 32. See id. at 1127 (“[A]vailability is affected by factors other than frequency and 
probability . . . .  In addition to familiarity, there are other factors such as salience”); see 
also Rabin, supra note 30, at 30–31. 
 33. On the tendency to disregard the lessons of history, see, e.g., CARMEN M. 
REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF 
FINANCIAL FOLLY xxvi – xxviii (2009); CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, 
AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (4th ed. 2000). 
 34. See Neil D. Weinstein, Optimistic Biases About Personal Risks, 246 SCIENCE 
1232, 1232 (1989); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 
39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 806 (1980). 
 35. See Weinstein, Optimistic Biases, supra note 34; Weinstein, Unrealistic 
Optimism, supra note 34.  
 36. The benefit of optimism is that it makes life easier, and enables bolder action.  
See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The “New” Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, 
and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 760 (2000) (citing evidence that 
“only clinically depressed people make accurate predictions about their likelihood of 
success”). 
 37. See Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the 
Determinants of Confidence, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 411, 411–12 (1992) (examining 
overconfidence among experts); see also Simon Gervais & Terrance Odean, Learning 
to Be Overconfident, 14 REV. FIN. STUD. 1, 1 (2001) (providing evidence of 
overconfidence as a result of successful trading). 
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did not seem so beforehand.38  Closely related is the confirmation bias, 
which means that people tend to emphasize information that supports 
their past decisions and downplay contrary evidence.39 
Extremeness aversion.  People avoid extremes—or, more precisely, 
what they perceive as extremes.40  Closely related are so-called “framing 
effects,” whereby the choice of available options influences the 
outcome, even when some alternatives are seemingly irrelevant. 41  
Additionally, there is the anchoring heuristic, which states that people 
are reluctant to depart significantly from an initial position or value, 
even when the initial position was chosen arbitrarily.42  These heuristics 
and biases may lead to suboptimal choices, but they can also be used to 
help people make better choices by framing the options differently.43 
Status quo bias.  People are attached to the status quo and demand a 
great deal to justify departures from it.44  Reference levels of income and 
rights, for example, have a significant impact on bargaining, because 
what matters most are the gains and losses from the reference point.45  
As will be shown, status quo bias may also be employed in law to create 
lighter regulations.46 
Herding effects.  When it comes to choices involving complex 
information and significant uncertainty, many people, consciously or 
                                                                                                                                         
 38. Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight Is Not Equal to Foresight: The Effect of Outcome 
Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. 
PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288, 288 (1975) (providing empirical evidence); Rabin, 
supra note 30, at 29–30 (discussing the hindsight bias). 
 39. See Robert Forsythe, Forrest Nelson, George R. Neumann & Jack Wright, 
Anatomy of an Experimental Political Stock Market, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 1142 (1992) 
(discussing empirical evidence); Rabin, supra note 30, at 26–29 (reviewing empirical 
literature). 
 40. See Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrast 
and Extremeness Aversion, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 281, 281 (1992) (discussing 
empirical evidence). 
 41. See Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for 
Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1458–60 (2003) (discussing framing 
effects). 
 42. See Rabin, supra note 30, at 29 (discussing anchoring and adjustment). 
 43. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 8 (proposing a range of policy 
opportunities along these lines). 
 44. See generally William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in 
Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988) (providing experimental data). 
 45. See Rabin, supra note 30, at 13–16 (discussing examples of reference levels); 
see also Kahneman, supra note 41, at 1454–58 (discussing prospect theory). 
 46. See infra Part III.A. 
2012] THE BEHAVORIAL PARADOX AND REGULATION 43 
unconsciously, look to what others are doing as evidence of what is 
optimal.47  Imitation is an efficient heuristic in many circumstances, and 
sometimes herding is entirely rational.48  However, herding may also be 
driven by greed, fear, and other psychological factors.49  In any event, 
herding can have drastic social consequences, and it is an important (at 
least partial) explanation of financial manias and bubbles, such as the 
1990s dot-com boom and the structured finance bubble of the early 
2000s.50 
Self-serving attribution bias.  Most people are not very objective 
about their merits and failures: on the one hand, we tend to take too 
much credit for real or supposed successes (self-enhancing bias); on the 
other hand, we tend to downplay and even deny our responsibility for 
                                                                                                                                         
 47. Andrea Devenow & Ivo Welch, Rational Herding in Financial Economics, 40 
EUR. ECON. REV. 603, 603 (1996) (“Imitation and mimicry are perhaps among our most 
basic instincts.”). 
 48. Id. at 605–07 (describing rational forms of herding in financial markets). See 
also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 1023, 1037–41 (2000) (discussing multiple explanations for herd behavior). In 
the famous words of Keynes, “it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to 
succeed unconventionally.” KEYNES, supra note 1, at 63. Thus the optimal approach for 
fund managers is often to follow a commonly adopted investment strategy, so that 
unexpected losses will be attributed to systematic risk rather than to the fund manager’s 
incompetence. This creates a structural tendency for fund managers to move with the 
market and not against it. The “herding incentive” seems to be especially strong for 
young fund managers. See Judith Chevalier & Glenn Ellison, Career Concerns of 
Mutual Fund Managers, 114 Q.J. ECON. 389, 391 (1999). 
 49. See Robert R. Prechter, Jr., Unconscious Herding Behavior as the 
Psychological Basis of Financial Market Trends and Patterns, 2 J. PSYCHOL. & FIN. 
MARKETS 120, 124 (2001) (advocating this view); William Landberg, Fear, Greed and 
the Madness of Markets, J. ACCT., Apr. 2003, at 79 (arguing that markets are driven by 
greed and fear). 
 50. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2d ed. 2005) (discussing 
financial market developments in the 1990s and early 2000s); see also KINDLEBERGER, 
supra note 33 (discussing earlier financial crises). There may, of course, be some 
investors who realize what is going on; but they may benefit from the herding behavior 
of others, or they may simply be unable to stop it. While herding alone is unlikely to 
explain the existence of financial bubbles, it explains why they tend to be so large. 
Other psychological factors also contribute to financial bubbles, including the 
availability heuristic. See Martti Vihanto, Extending Austrian Economics Toward 
Psychology: Rules in Loan Decisions, 17 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 323, 337–338 (2004) 
(explaining how the availability heuristic reinforces upward and downward tendencies 
in good and bad times, respectively). 
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failure (self-protective bias).51  As will be shown, self-serving bias is 
important for understanding some of the dynamics of regulatory rule-
making.52 
2. Bounded Willpower   
The notion of bounded willpower refers to the idea that people do 
not always choose optimally because they lack the willpower to do so.  
This notion is closely related to that of bounded rationality, but it 
emphasizes the aspect of emotions and our imperfect control over them.  
We sometimes find ourselves in powerful but transient emotional states, 
which almost seem to force us to choose something that we later 
regret.53  For example, people wish to adopt healthier lifestyles in the 
interest of long-term well-being, but find themselves unable to quit their 
vices.54 
Projection bias.  One explanation for heat of the moment behavior 
is projection bias, which means falsely projecting current preferences 
onto the future.55  We place too much importance on immediate benefits 
and downplay the costs that come later.  In the realm of financial 
markets, an important instance of projection bias and weak self-control 
                                                                                                                                         
 51. See Dale T. Miller & Michael Ross, Self-serving Biases in the Attribution of 
Causality: Fact or Fiction?, 82 PSYCHOL. BULL. 213, 214 n.1 (1975); Jerry Suls, 
Katherine Lemos & H. Lockett Stewart, Self-esteem, Construal, and Comparisons with 
the Self, Friends and Peers, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 252, 252 (2002); 
Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of 
Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 110 (1997) (reviewing studies on self-
serving biases). 
 52. See infra Part VI.A. 
 53. See Camerer et al., supra note 7, at 1238 (“People buy cars they cannot quite 
afford after breathing in the intoxicating new-car smell during a test drive. Others get 
married in the heat of passion or commit suicide when depression is particularly 
intense.”). 
 54. Mark Grinblatt & Matti Keloharju, Sensation Seeking, Overconfidence, and 
Trading Activity, 64 J. FIN. 549, 549 (2009).  Another example would be addictive 
behavior, which seems to explain some aspects of excessive trading in financial 
markets. See Roser Granero et al., Gambling on the Stock Market: An Unexplored 
Issue, 53 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 666, 666 (2012). 
 55. See George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Projection Bias 
in Predicting Future Utility, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1209, 1209 (2003). 
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is the tendency to spend beyond one’s means, such as with high interest-
rate credit cards.56 
Procrastination.  A different aspect of bounded willpower is 
procrastination, which refers to our tendency to postpone tasks that we 
should carry out now.57  Procrastination seems to be rooted in present-
based biases, where the costs of acting are incurred now and the benefits 
come later.  A common example of procrastination is the tendency to 
delay unpleasant tasks until the last minute.  In a sense, procrastination 
(costs now, benefits later) is the converse of projection bias and heat of 
the moment behavior (benefits now, costs later). Procrastination is one 
explanation of why many people find it difficult to save as much as they 
would like for “rainy days” and other future needs.58 
 
B. DOES BEHAVIORAL FINANCE MATTER FOR REGULATION?  
OPPOSING VIEWS 
 
What all this means for financial regulation is far from settled. 
Proponents of regulatory intervention have invoked investor irrationality 
as a basis for existing and further regulation.59  It has been argued that 
the behavioral approach to law and economics has been markedly 
paternalistic and interventionist.60  Regulatory skeptics have responded 
to these tendencies by pointing out that the evidence on investor 
irrationality is inconclusive and its magnitude probably insignificant; 
                                                                                                                                         
 56. See George-Marios Angeletos et al., The Hyperbolic Consumption Model: 
Calibration, Simulation, and Empirical Evaluation, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 47, 47–48 
(2001) (discussing evidence and modeling the hyperbolic consumption model); Oren 
Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1373–75 (2004) (discussing the 
economics and regulation of credit cards). 
 57. See George A. Akerlof, Procrastination and Obedience, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 
(PAPERS & PROC.) 1, 3–8 (1991) (illustrating the costs of procrastination through 
mathematical models); Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing it Now or Later, 89 
AM. ECON. REV. 103, 103 (1999) (creating a model of present-based biases). 
 58. See Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow: Using 
Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 112 J. POL. ECON. S164 (2004) 
(discussing evidence and proposing a solution). 
 59. See, e.g., Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral 
Observations Regarding Proposals for Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397 (2002) (defending 
securities regulation against deregulation proposals); Lawrence A. Cunningham, 
Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 770–71 
(2002) (proposing more regulation); Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits 
of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. 
REV. 135, 138–39 (2002) (proposing more regulation). 
 60. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 5, at 4–5. 
46 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
that competitive markets will tend to wipe out irrational actors; and that, 
in any case, regulators also suffer from imperfect rationality and cannot 
be relied on to correct the biases of others.61 
It may be that both sides to the debate have touched upon aspects of 
the truth, and it is not necessary to side with either extreme view.62  
Note, for example, that the implications of bounded rationality among 
regulators may be very different from those of bounded rationality 
among investors.  If regulators do suffer from behavioral biases, that 
certainly is an important factor to consider in designing good laws and 
regulations.  It is not, however, a sufficient reason to conclude that 
regulation should be designed as if all the relevant actors—investors, 
regulators, and others—acted according to the model of perfect 
rationality; the entire analysis has to be adapted. 
Moreover, the opposition of competing visions of financial 
regulation is reinforced by psychological factors such as overconfidence 
and confirmation bias.63  These biases lead researchers to overestimate 
their own infallibility and to highlight evidence that supports their 
convictions. 64   At the same time they downplay contrary evidence, 
especially when there are strong ideological issues at stake. 65   
Sometimes even the terms of the debate get distorted: it is assumed that 
people are either perfectly rational or entirely irrational, when in fact 
the behavioral approach only speaks to bounded or imperfect rationality, 
willpower, and self-interest.  The behavioral approach is best seen as a 
complement—not a rival—to alternative perspectives such as 
                                                                                                                                         
 61. See generally Choi & Pritchard, supra note 5. See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1056–58 
(2000) (arguing that while herd behavior and status quo bias might result in a capital 
market failure, a mandatory disclosure system may not be necessary in highly evolved 
capital markets). 
 62. This is not mere extremeness aversion. 
 63. See John Kay, Why Economists Still Stubbornly Stick to Their Guns, FIN. 
TIMES, Apr. 16, 2011, at 7 (arguing that after the financial crisis, “the lesson most 
people have learnt is that they were right all along”). 
 64. See, for example, Choi & Pritchard, supra note 5, at 71, who argue that the 
proponents of behavioral securities regulation are guilty of confirmation bias. It is 
however not difficult to see the same bias at work in Choi and Pritchard’s own criticism 
of the behavioral approach; for example, they give significant importance to its 
theoretical weaknesses in Choi & Pritchard, supra note 5, at 9–11, forgetting that 
perfect-rationality economics is guilty of many similar defects, and certainly was more 
so in its earlier stages of development. 
 65. Id. at 30 n.147. 
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asymmetric information, principal-agent problems, and public choice 
theory.  The model that most completely incorporates relevant factors 
(without becoming so complex that it no longer serves as a model at all) 
is likely to be the best model for explaining and predicting market and 
regulatory outcomes. 66   However—and here is the twist—the mere 
existence of biases and other departures from the standard rational 
choice model does not necessarily justify more extensive regulation of 
financial markets, as will be shown infra. 
 
C. SOME DOUBTS ABOUT THE PRECISION AND APPLICATION  
OF BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 
 
Before proceeding to the substantive discussion, it is worthwhile to 
highlight some methodological challenges. The first relates to the 
precision of behavioral theory, and the second to the application of 
behavioral explanations to concrete cases in financial markets. 
Behavioral economics is not a deep and holistic theory of real, 
flesh-and-blood human behavior.  Rather, just like all economics, it is a 
simplification based on experimental findings, observations, and the 
like.  Likewise, in psychology, there are various theories related to these 
findings, and our understanding of their deeper causes is limited.67  The 
practical effect (and even the existence) of various behavioral biases and 
anomalies depends on a host of factors, including the specific person in 
question and the context.  As such, the notion of bias is nothing more 
than a rough estimation of a likely direction of departure from ideal 
                                                                                                                                         
 66. Economists tend to overemphasize the importance of model simplicity, even 
though explanatory power is normally a more important factor of model quality. See 
Andrew M. Yuengert, Model Selection and Multiple Research Goals: The Case of 
Rational Addiction, 13 J. ECON. METHODOLOGY 77, 93 (2006) (“Empirical fit deserves 
its high rank among the goals economists seek. The principle of parsimony, however, 
should not be applied blindly to promote empirical fit, since it may retard the pursuit of 
other goals important to economists: understanding and policy usefulness.”).  One also 
wonders whether those same economists practice what they preach, given the high 
complexity of most economics publications. See Matthew Rabin, A Perspective on 
Psychology and Economics, 46 EUR. ECON. REV. 657, 673 (2002) (“Economists do not 
shy away from complicated models nearly as much as some claim when embroiled in 
the midst of abstract methodological debates. It is odd on the one hand to be told during 
such debates that economists must forego behavioral realism for the sake of keeping our 
models simple – when on the other hand we are holding a copy of Econometrica.”). 
 67. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 5, at 9–11 (critically reviewing the literature). 
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choice—interesting and sometimes useful, but not very precise. 68  
Moreover, bounded rationality does not equate with irrationality: 
heuristics are often sensible and helpful responses to limited cognitive 
capacity, and they help us make satisfactory choices most of the time.69 
This has important implications for the theory of regulation. Firstly, 
we do not fully appreciate why, when, and which people make 
suboptimal choices (and how suboptimal those choices really are).  Thus 
we do not fully understand how to help people make better choices 
without harming their freedom to choose.  Besides, lawyers (who 
usually have no training in behavioral sciences) should be especially 
wary about making sweeping law reform proposals based on an 
imperfect theory, the limits of which they may not appreciate.70 
Secondly, the concept of suboptimality can be misleading, because 
it does not tell us if there is a serious problem, or whether the departure 
from perfect choice is so marginal that it makes no practical difference.  
This is a major issue to consider, because trying to assist people in one 
way or another may cause significant costs—especially indirect costs 
due to unintended consequences (this difficulty is aggravated by the 
limits of our understanding of these issues).  Finally, the extent of biases 
and anomalies varies among persons, and people can learn and develop 
better strategies of behavior, often in response to past mistakes.71 
The theoretical limits of behavioral law and economics also give 
rise to another challenge, namely the difficulty of isolating the effects of 
behavioral biases from those of other factors such as faulty monetary 
and regulatory policies.  For example, the recent crisis has often been 
blamed on the failure of markets, and heavy government intervention 
has been seen as the logical response.  Greed, shortsightedness, and 
                                                                                                                                         
 68. See Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should 
Not be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 
67, 67 (2002) (“[P]eople are not equally irrational and  . . . situational variables exert an 
important influence on the rationality of behavior.”). 
 69. That is, after all, the standard meaning of a heuristic. On the benefits and limits 
of “intuitive” thinking, see Kahneman, supra note 41, at 1467–69. One of the 
challenges is learning how and when to use heuristics correctly. See generally DANIEL 
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (Farrar, Straus & Giroux eds., 2011). 
 70. Mitchell, supra note 68, at 127 (“[L]egal scholars who have no training in the 
social sciences or who have only a superficial understanding of behavioral decision 
theory should refrain from the unaided application of behavior decision theory to the 
law.”). 
 71. See infra Part VII. 
2012] THE BEHAVORIAL PARADOX AND REGULATION 49 
investor irrationality have been prominent explanations, especially in the 
popular media.72  But it is debatable whether such an explanation is 
sufficient, as is evidenced by the number of alternate theories proposed.  
For example, it has been widely argued that imprudent monetary policy 
was a major contributor to the crisis.73  A long period of unusually and 
artificially low interest rates contributed to a climate of short-term 
speculation and distorted credit markets and risk-management.  Unwise 
monetary policy also fueled the development of the infamous subprime 
mortgage markets.74  It has also been demonstrated that a major cause of 
unhealthy subprime loans was a string of flawed government policies, 
which fostered and even ordered the growth of subprime loans without 
duly taking into account the inevitable unintended consequences.75  Of 
course, there have also been many other contributing causes to the crisis, 
including insufficient and misleading accounting principles, inflexible 
and outdated principles of banking regulation, questionable bonus 
practices, problematic risk management, failed corporate governance, 
and the distortion of credit rating practices due to their role in the 
regulatory system, to name a few.76 
                                                                                                                                         
 72. Surprisingly, even Judge Posner seemed to take this view, not on grounds of 
investor irrationality but based on the incentive problems of the financial industry. See 
generally RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE 
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009). 
 73. See JOHN B. TAYLOR, GETTING OFF TRACK: HOW GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND 
INTERVENTIONS CAUSED, PROLONGED, AND WORSENED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 1–14 
(2009) (investigating the failure of U.S. monetary policy); John Greenwood, The 
Successes and Failures of UK Monetary Policy, 2000–08, in VERDICT ON THE CRASH: 
CAUSES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 37 (Philip Booth ed., 2009) (charting the recent 
successes and failures of monetary policy in the UK). 
 74. TAYLOR, supra note 73, at 11–13. 
 75. See id. at 13–14; Mark W. Nichols, Jill M. Hendrickson & Kevin Griffith, Was 
the Financial Crisis the Result of Ineffective Policy and Too Much Regulation? An 
Empirical Investigation, 12 J. BANKING REG. 236, 237 (2011); STAN J. LIEBOWITZ, 
INDEP. INST., ANATOMY OF A TRAIN WRECK: CAUSES OF THE MORTGAGE MELTDOWN 4 
(2008) (blaming the crisis on government interventions that undermined mortgage 
underwriting standards since early 1990s); R. CHRISTOPHER WHALEN, NETWORKS FIN. 
INST. AT IND. STATE UNIV., THE SUBPRIME CRISIS: CAUSE, EFFECT AND CONSEQUENCES 
1 (2008) (blaming the public policy partnership that compromised companies in its 
attempt to enhance the availability of affordable housing); Eamonn Butler, The 
Financial Crisis: Blame Governments, Not Bankers, in VERDICT ON THE CRASH, supra 
note 73, at 51–57 (highlighting ill-advised government policies in the mortgage sector 
since the 1970s). 
 76. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-739, FINANCIAL 
CRISIS HIGHLIGHTS NEED TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF LEVERAGE AT FINANCIAL 
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There is room for legitimate disagreement and debate on the causes 
of the financial crisis (or earlier crises), but one implication for 
behavioral financial regulation is unavoidable: how are we to assess 
different regulatory responses, when we really do not know to what 
extent those problems were caused by imperfect rationality as opposed 
to misguided government policies?  It may be possible to devise policies 
that help people make wiser choices. However, we have little 
information about how people would have acted in a sounder monetary-
economic and legal-regulatory environment. 77   Perhaps “investor 
irrationality” is just a red herring—an easy explanation that in reality 
had only marginal explanatory power.  Deviations from optimal choice 
might even be so insignificant as to merit little discussion, and even the 
best-designed light-touch regulations would have some unintended side-
effects that are difficult to determine in advance—or even to appreciate 
                                                                                                                                         
INSTITUTIONS AND ACROSS SYSTEM (2009), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09739.pdf (charting the effect of leverage in financial 
institutions on the crisis); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY 
REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION (2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/ 
Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf (providing a range of policy recommendations); FIN. 
SERVICES AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL 
BANKING CRISIS (2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/ 
turner_review.pdf (investigating the causes of the crisis, especially in the UK); HIGH-
LEVEL GROUP ON FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN THE EU, LAROSIÈRE REPORT (2009), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/ 
de_larosiere_report_en.pdf (examining regulatory weaknesses in Europe and globally); 
COMM’N OF INVESTIGATION INTO THE BANKING SECTOR IN IR., MISJUDGING RISK: 
CAUSES OF THE SYSTEMIC BANKING CRISIS IS IRELAND (2011), available at 
http://www.bankinginquiry.gov.ie (examining the causes of the banking crisis in 
Ireland). Note, further, that many of these problems have been present in earlier 
financial crises. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof et al., Looting: The Economic Underworld 
of Bankruptcy for Profit, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, 1993 at 1 (providing 
a classic study on the “looting” of financial companies). In a comment attached to the 
same article, Gregory Mankiw interestingly argues: “The paper shows that the savings 
and loan crisis [of the 1980s] was the result not of unregulated markets, but of 
overregulated ones (or, at least, poorly regulated ones). After reading the paper, one is 
left with the impression that the policy mistakes that happened here are probably not 
isolated, and that the only good solution is to get the government out of this kind of 
business altogether.” Id. at 65. 
 77. The crisis of the late 1920s was originally blamed on investor irrationality, but 
the standard revisionist explanation puts the blame on misguided monetary policy. The 
growth of financial regulation as a result of that crisis was generally justified on the 
basis of “market failure,” but in retrospect it is unclear to what extent such failure was 
intertwined with bad monetary policy. 
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in retrospect, as much of the discussion on the causes of the recent crisis 
demonstrates.  Importantly, even apparent light-touch regulations carry 
the risk of complicating the legal system, increasing the prominence and 
discretionary power of regulatory authorities, and creating a justification 
for increasing intervention if those regulations seem to fail. 
 
II. DEBIASING THROUGH LAW: LIGHT-TOUCH REGULATIONS 
 
In general, bounded rationality and bounded willpower imply that 
people may make suboptimal choices.  It may be appropriate to try to 
help them make better choices, and in extremis, to protect them from 
their weaknesses.  However, it is not a foregone conclusion that heavy 
intervention is the optimal policy.  It may be that simple “light-touch” 
regulations more effectively help market participants improve their 
choices.  Indeed, our knowledge of certain common heuristics and 
biases points to different ways of influencing choice without imposing 
expensive and intrusive regulations.78 
One framework for developing effective light-touch regulations is 
asymmetric paternalism.79  The model assumes that some people behave 
more rationally than others.  In turn, the more rational types would 
prefer more freedom and innovation, while less rational people would 
benefit from guidance and protection.80  The optimal regulatory scheme 
may take these differences into account by seeking to help the less-
rational actors make better choices, without unduly restricting the 
options (choices) of the more-rational actors.81  There are four types of 
regulatory tools (in the order of increasing intervention) that seek to 
cater to both groups: default rules, framing and information disclosure 
rules, cooling-off periods, and limitations on choice.82  The first three 
will be discussed in the following section, with applications to financial 
regulation. 
A. DEFAULT RULES 
The status quo bias explains why people often stick to default 
options unless there are clearly better alternatives. 83   The anchoring 
                                                                                                                                         
 78. See Jolls & Sunstein, Debiasing, supra note 9, at 200–01. 
 79. See Camerer et al., supra note 7, at 1211 
 80. Id. at 1219–20. 
 81. Id. at 1221. 
 82. Id. at 1224–50. 
 83. Id. at 1224. 
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heuristic also implies that if a departure is made, it is usually “anchored” 
to the default rule.  There may also be other reasons for the strength of 
default rules; for example, default rules will mean more certain legal 
outcomes if there are interpretation problems by imperfectly rational 
judges.84 
One area for potentially beneficial applications of default rule 
regulation is the home mortgage market, a market where bounded 
rationality and bounded willpower seem to present significant issues.85  
Consumers frequently focus on wrong or irrelevant information, make 
unrealistic assumptions, and cannot estimate probabilities accurately.86  
Moreover, the behavioral biases of consumers may be exacerbated by 
banks that benefit from exploiting these weaknesses.87  For example, one 
of the causes of the recent mortgage crisis was the development of 
complex loan agreements that borrowers did not understand and that 
appeared much cheaper and less risky than in actuality.88 
The standard response to such problems would be to either improve 
disclosure or product regulation.89  The trouble is that merely requiring 
increased disclosure may backfire, especially if the purpose of the 
regulation can be avoided by asking applicants to sign complex 
disclosure forms they do not understand. 90   Some type of product 
regulation might be necessary to prevent harmful contractual provisions; 
                                                                                                                                         
 84. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. 
Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1121 (1998) (discussing the 
benefits of default rules). 
 85. See Elizabeth Warren & Oren Bar-Gill, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1, 39-41 (2008) (discussing problems with mortgages and credit cards). 
 86. MICHAEL S. BARR, SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN & ELDAR SHAFIR, NEW AMERICA 
FOUNDATION, BEHAVIORALLY INFORMED FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATION 8 (Oct. 
2008), http://www.newamerica.net/files/naf_behavioral_v5.pdf. 
 87. See id. at 3 (explaining that market participants may seek to either mitigate or 
exacerbate the behavioral biases of others, depending on their products and services). 
For example, consumers generally misunderstand compounding, and this is likely to 
reduce saving and increase spending; companies that offer investment services will 
want to reduce the bias to increase their savings base, and companies that offer credit 
will want to exploit the bias to increase borrowing. Unfortunately, especially in the case 
of lower-income persons, the incentives for bias-reduction seem to be weak. 
 88. Id. at 8 (“How many homeowners really understand how the teaser rate, 
introductory rate and reset rate relate to the London interbank offered rate plus some 
specified margin, or can judge whether the prepayment penalty will offset the gains 
from the teaser rate?”). 
 89. Id. at 1. 
 90. Id. 
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examples include prepayment penalties, short-term ARMs, and balloon 
payments.91  However, imposing an outright ban on innovative mortgage 
offers would stifle innovation and harm both lenders and borrowers in 
the long run.92  It is also quite likely that such regulations would be 
imperfect. Moreover, the fear of imposing unnecessarily restrictive rules 
may cause unintended loopholes. 
Default rules with opt-outs might be a better option.93  There could 
be a default mortgage deal, or even a menu of “plain vanilla” mortgages, 
which would not include hard-to-understand details or complex interest 
rate calculation rules that exploit common psychological biases.94  Such 
mortgages would be easier to compare across different offerings. A 
regulatory authority could periodically revise the default menu, possibly 
on the basis of consumer experimental design or survey research.95 
Such default rules alone might not be sufficient if there are 
significant market pressures and incentives for lenders and brokers to 
provide alternative deals; however, the default rules could be made 
“sticky” through creative legal principles.96 
For example, the law could stipulate different interpretative 
principles applicable to default and alternative contracts.  If the loans did 
not work out, the alternative contracts would impose additional legal 
exposure on lenders through increased scrutiny or even a higher 
standard.97  The result would be a safer and simpler mortgage market, 
combined with the possibility of innovation with products that are truly 
functional and that can be adequately explained to borrowers. 
Something similar could be developed for credit cards.98  Credit 
card product offerings seem to be systematically designed to exploit 
common behavioral biases; for example, many consumers underestimate 
how much they will borrow and overestimate their ability to pay on 
time.99  In addition, the pricing of credit cards is set to benefit from late 
                                                                                                                                         
 91. Id. at 8. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. at 8–11 (outlining a default rules proposal). 
 94. Id.at 9. 
 95. Id. at 11. 
 96. Id. at 9. 
 97. Id. (“[I]f default occurs when a borrower opts out, the borrower could raise the 
lack of reasonable disclosure as a defense to bankruptcy or foreclosure.”). 
 98. See id. at 13–15 (outlining a proposal for default-rule credit card regulation). 
 99. See Bar-Gill, supra note 56, at 1375–76. 
54 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
payment.100  It seems that competitive market dynamics currently are not 
conducive to debiasing offerings by credit card companies. 
A light-touch regulatory solution would be to develop a default 
payment plan for credit cards, so that “consumers would be required 
automatically to make the payment necessary to pay off their existing 
balance over a relatively short period of time unless the customer 
affirmatively opted-out of such a payment plan.”101  Going a bit further, 
it would also be possible to require credit card companies to develop a 
standard “plain vanilla” credit card with straightforward terms and 
honest pricing, analogous to the default mortgage loan regulation 
described above.  Most people would likely choose these default options 
and, if necessary, these options could be rendered “stickier” through 
similar creative legal strategies as discussed above.  Formally, the 
“stickier” the default regulation, the more it resembles outright product 
regulation. 
B. INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 
People often fail to correctly interpret large amounts of 
information, and the way the information is presented has a systematic 
influence on choices.102  Behavioral economics implies that regulations 
should not necessarily emphasize disclosure of information, but rather 
the way relevant information is presented.103 
Home mortgages and credit cards again provide a useful example.  
The existing regulatory scheme focuses on disclosure regulations, as 
well as usury laws and product restrictions.104  In light of behavioral 
economics, the former may be insufficient, while the latter may be 
unnecessarily restrictive.  The problem with disclosure regulation arises 
because the regulatory model is based on the assumption of asymmetric 
information and perfectly rational consumers.105  As a result, consumers 
usually have more information than they can synthesize, and final 
                                                                                                                                         
 100. See Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card 
Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375, 384–92 (2007) (explaining the “sweat box” business 
model and the pricing of credit card debt). 
 101. BARR ET AL., supra note 86, at 13. 
 102. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 103. See Camerer et al., supra note 7, at 1230–32 (explaining this principle and 
providing examples). 
 104. BARR ET AL., supra note 86, at 1. 
 105. See id. at 2. 
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decisions often hinge on factors consumers mistakenly take as 
paramount—financial theory notwithstanding—such as the size of 
monthly payments. 106   Credit card users also find it difficult to 
understand the complex terms and implications of different offerings. 
In addition to default options, regulation may seek to debias 
consumer choices by influencing what information is presented and 
how.  Some existing regulations do exactly this, such as those which 
stipulate the calculation and disclosure of the annual percentage rate 
(APR). 107   However, much more could be done.  For example, 
consumers seem to make a number of unwise assumptions to justify 
their reliance on banks’ potentially self-interested advice instead of 
doing more personal investigation.  Consumers often believe that the 
bank is offering them the optimal deal, that they would only be offered 
the loan if the bank thought they could repay the loan, and that the 
regulators are protecting their interests. 108   Unfortunately, these and 
similar assumptions increase the opportunities for more ruthless 
mortgage lenders and brokers.  One improvement could be to require 
credit providers to reveal to the borrower additional information 
regarding their loan application, such as the borrower’s credit score and 
their qualifications for all of the lender’s mortgage products.109  That 
would pressure creditors and brokers to be honest in their dealings with 
mortgage applicants. 110   It might also be appropriate to move from 
strictly ex ante disclosure regimes towards standards-based ex post 
regulation that focuses on whether the disclosure was really meaningful 
and sufficient.111 
                                                                                                                                         
 106. Id. 
 107. These rules are not perfect, however, because there tends to be some discretion 
and variation on which costs must be included in the calculation of APR. See LONDON 
ECON. & ACHIM DÜBEL, STUDY ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE DIFFERENT POLICY 
OPTIONS FOR MORTGAGE CREDIT: FINAL REPORT TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 168–
74 (2009) (discussing the rules in different EU countries). 
 108. See BARR ET AL., supra note 86, at 5 (“Because I am qualified for the loan that 
must mean that the lender thinks that I can repay the loan. Why else would they lend 
me the money? Moreover, the government tightly regulates home mortgages; they 
make the lender give me all these legal forms. Surely the government must regulate all 
aspects of this transaction.”).  This speculation of consumer reasoning illustrates the 
problem of having too much superficial regulation: unsophisticated market participants 
may believe that they are better protected than they really are. 
 109. Id. at 6. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See id. at 6–7 (proposing standard-based ex post regulation). Note, however, 
that the standard-based regime might entail significant costs—especially uncertainty 
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Similar disclosure solutions could be developed for credit card 
agreements, where consumers generally find it difficult to understand 
compounding and timing issues. 112   A tailored disclosure regulation 
would focus on salient information such as: 
[H]ow long it would take, and how much interest would be paid, if 
the customer’s actual balance were paid off only in minimum 
payments, and card companies could be required to state the monthly 
payment amount that would be required to pay the customer’s actual 
balance in full over some reasonable period time.113 
Such regulation would be simple, impose minimal cost, help 
consumers focus on relevant facts, and encourage healthier competition 
based on real value to consumers. 
Financial regulation could also target overoptimism bias by 
exploiting the availability heuristic.114  Many consumer credit customers 
significantly underestimate the risk of running into payment difficulties.  
A lack of caution may lead to tragic outcomes, and distorts the market in 
favor of risky products.  Generalized warnings tend not to be effective, 
and merely demanding more disclosure would only exacerbate 
information overload.115  What might be more effective is some tailored 
requirement of disclosing vivid—perhaps even shocking—information 
about real cases that have gone wrong. 
                                                                                                                                         
costs. Some of those costs could be reduced by providing credit providers with model 
disclosure forms that are likely to satisfy the standard. But one factor the authors do not 
consider is the problem of hindsight bias with ex post regulation: if a case goes to court 
after something goes wrong, a boundedly rational judge is likely to believe that those 
events, which actually did take place, were much more likely to have happened than 
they appeared to be to a reasonable person at the time of making the loan. 
 112. Id. at 12. 
 113. Id. at 13. As of February 2012, Federal Reserve Regulation Z requires credit 
card companies to include information on how long it will take for a customer to pay 
off his balance by making minimum payments. See What You Need to Know: New 
Credit Card Rules Effective Feb. 22, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
SYSTEM (Nov. 20, 2012), http://federalreserve.gov/consumerinfo/ 
wyntk_creditcardrules.htm.  
 114. See Jolls & Sunstein, Debiasing, supra note 9, at 212–13 (discussing debiasing 
through the availability heuristic). 
 115. See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its 
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 419 (2003) (discussing 
information overload in securities regulation). 
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Additionally, overoptimism could be debiased through information 
regulation that makes use of the common phenomenon of loss aversion, 
where losses are weighted more heavily than gains.116  For example, 
home mortgage offers could be combined with statistical information 
about the amount of payment difficulties in similar types of loans over a 
specified period of time.  By requiring firms to highlight the potential 
negative consequences of the use of their products, the law could help 
consumers make more informed choices without imposing much 
regulatory cost or limiting the options available to consumers. In another 
example, the U.S. Truth in Lending Act requires lenders to inform 
borrowers as follows: “If you obtain this loan, the lender will have a 
mortgage on your home.  You could lose your home, and any money 
you have put into it, if you do not meet your obligations under the 
loan.”117 In practice, however, without further evidence it is difficult to 
assess the impact of generalized warnings.  Further, we do not want to 
turn people into overpessimists. 
C. COOLING OFF 
Cooling-off periods may be the optimal regulatory solution when 
the issue is rooted in problems of self-control.118  Bounded self-control 
may be relevant in various types of financial behavior.  Furthermore, it 
is closely related to bounded rationality, as tempting offers that exploit 
projection bias tend to reduce rational deliberation. 
The U.S. Mortgage Disclosure Improvement Act of 2008,119  an 
amendment to the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), tries to improve 
consumer mortgage choice through cooling-off regulation: the “3/7/3 
Rule” requires a seven business day waiting period once the initial 
disclosure is provided before closing a home loan.120  In addition, if the 
                                                                                                                                         
 116. See Jolls & Sunstein, Debiasing, supra note 9, at 205–06 (discussing the 
options for an advertising campaign to publicize the effects of breast-feeding on 
newborn health). 
 117. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a)(1)(B) (2006). 
 118. See Camerer et al., supra note 7, at 1238–47 (discussing the behavioral case for 
cooling-off regulations). 
 119. Mortgage Disclosure Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, §§ 2501-
03, 122 Stat. 2654, 2855 (2008) (to be codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1638(b)(2)). 
 120. David A. Miller, New Truth in Lending Rules for New Homebuyers, ARTICLE 
ALLEY (July 13, 2009), http://davemillerloans.articlealley.com/new-truth-in-lending-
rules-for-new-homebuyers-1008568.html; Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (2008) 
(to be codified at scattered sections of 12, 15, 26, 37, 38, and 42 U.S.C.A.). 
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final APR is more than 0.125% different from the initial good faith 
estimate (GFE) disclosure, then the lender must re-disclose and wait 
another three business days before closing on the transaction. 121  
Assuming that the self-control problem is a major issue, cooling-off 
rules might be the appropriate regulatory option in other areas, too.  
Choi and Pritchard wondered whether trading delays could be used 
fruitfully to discourage trading based on overconfidence and irrational, 
addictive speculation.122 
There are, however, potential difficulties with such a regulatory 
strategy.  For one thing, the precise nature of optimal cooling-off 
regulation requires much deliberation.  On a general level, one can 
consider two alternatives: (a) waiting periods, during which the 
transaction cannot be completed, and (b) withdrawal periods, during 
which the initial decision may be reversed at will.123  Each approach has 
different implications.  The waiting period model is significantly more 
intrusive, and therefore not the prima facie alternative if we are to find 
the least interventionist regulation.  Moreover, in the context of financial 
markets, a mandatory waiting period would have to be rather short, 
perhaps only a few days.  The question then becomes how effective can 
such regulations be. 
The withdrawal period option would therefore seem more 
workable, and indeed it is a standard feature of consumer contract 
regulations.124  However, its effectiveness seems to be lessened by other 
behavioral biases.  The status quo and procrastination biases imply that 
people are reluctant to alter their position once a clear decision has been 
made.  The confirmation bias also implies that people tend to emphasize 
supportive evidence and downplay contrary evidence after a choice has 
been made.125  In any case, an unconditional withdrawal period could 
not be very extensive in the financial market context. 
                                                                                                                                         
 121. Id. 
 122. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 5, at 64–65. 
 123. See Camerer et al., supra note 7, at 1240–42 (discussing these alternatives). 
 124. Stefan Haupt, An Economic Analysis of Consumer Protection in Contract Law, 
4 German L. Rev. 1137, 1147–51 (2003); see also Protections for In-Home Purchases: 
The Cooling-Off Rule, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Nov. 20, 2012), 
http://consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0176-protections-home-purchases-cooling-rule. 
 125. Given the complexity of certain financial instruments, it is possible that 
investors experience significant uncertainty about their choices, but such uncertainty 
combined with status quo and confirmation biases may provoke unfruitful 
defensiveness and tunnel vision instead of prudent carefulness. 
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Finally, it should be emphasized that cooling-off rules may also be 
implemented in a market-based manner, which has the advantage of 
more efficient innovation and trial-and-error processes.  For example, an 
organizational rule requiring certain decisions to be confirmed by a 
relevant superior can also be seen as a form of cooling-off regulation. 
Such a rule may improve decision-making quality, because others are 
better able to spot cognitive biases.126  Moreover, overconfidence and 
overoptimism are reduced when one is forced to consider alternatives 
and counterarguments.127  It may not be appropriate or even possible to 
stipulate such requirements through law, but guideline-based soft law 
could foster valuable corporate governance solutions in this direction. 
III. NON-CONTRACTUAL DEBIASING INFORMATION 
A different question is whether decision-making can be improved 
by providing corrective or “debiasing” information outside the realm of 
contracts.  For example, one commentator proposes the development of 
[a] small set of measures of irrationality that can be calculated and 
published at least monthly. These might include measures related to 
expected personal income, job security and asset values; measures of 
expectations about the performance of the economy as a whole; and 
measures of hyperbolic discount rates and other specific observable 
cognitive biases.128 
It is possible to go further.  Taking a cue from Jolls, Sunstein, and 
Thaler,129 one could imagine someone engaging in the production of 
vivid propaganda—more effective than dry data—meant to 
“macromanage” public perceptions about the economy in a counter-
cyclical manner. The various possible ways of debiasing markets have 
yet to be explored. 
                                                                                                                                         
 126. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or 
Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61, 65–66 (2000). 
 127. Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein & Samuel Issacharoff, Creating 
Convergence: Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 LAW. & SOC. INQUIRY 913, 920 (1997); 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal 
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 588 (2002). 
 128. Leigh Caldwell, Behavioural Financial Regulation, VOX, (May 8, 2009), 
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3548. 
 129. Jolls et al., Behavioral Approach, supra note 2, at 1504, 1527 (discussing 
debiasing strategies). 
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The relevant question for the present discussion concerns the 
institutional arrangements for producing and distributing debiasing 
information. On the one hand, it seems laudable to seek to improve the 
action of public authorities by taking the latest behavioral research into 
account. On the other hand, there is reason to be skeptical about the 
ability of public authorities to perform their “debiasing role” without 
difficulties. 
A. REGULATORY FAILURE 
Before the recent financial crisis, privately run media sources such 
as The Economist published repeated warnings about mispricing in 
housing markets and abuses of securitization and complex financial 
derivatives.130  In contrast, many regulatory authorities seemed blissfully 
ignorant of these issues—or at least did not talk about them—though 
undoubtedly some regulators had a more accurate picture of the 
problem.  Certainly, not all market participants could claim to be more 
astute; we all suffer from some degree of cognitive bias, ignorance, and 
even incompetence. The relevant question here is how regulatory 
institutions should be designed so as to most effectively deal with these 
human imperfections. 
There are several reasons why we should not be excessively 
optimistic about the ability of the government to resolve behaviorally-
induced market failures.  Firstly, a frequent challenge for regulators and 
legislators is that they may lack relevant knowledge. 131   Secondly, 
behavioral economics is not a holistic theory and there are various 
interpretations of the empirical findings, creating uncertainty in its 
application to regulation.132  Thirdly, the exact implications of the theory 
in different settings are not clear, and it is difficult to say what kind of 
debiasing information would be most appropriate and effective. 133  
                                                                                                                                         
 130. E.g., The Bigger They Are: Are Big Banks in America and Europe Heading for 
Another Crisis, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 26, 2000), available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/404464 (criticizing securitization); Pass the Parcel: 
Grumbles in the Booming Market for Credit Derivatives, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 16, 
2003), available at http://www.economist.com/node/1537500 (critically discussing 
credit derivatives). 
 131. On the knowledge problem, see Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in 
Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). 
 132. Choi and Pritchard, supra note 5, at 9–11. 
 133. See supra Part II.C. 
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Finally, regulators’ ability to react to new information tends to lag 
because of weak incentives, bureaucratic work environments, and 
psychological inertia.134 
This issue relates to a different challenge, which is that regulators 
may not have the best of incentives to perform well.  They may be well-
meaning, but regulators, too, are subject to shirking, self-interested 
motives, and occasional manifest abuses of authority.  For example, a 
regulator of financial institutions may have an incentive not to bring 
emerging problems to the public’s attention, for risk of being regarded 
as someone who failed in his job.  The problem might just go away, and 
the costs of a real crisis would be borne by others.135  These problems 
will be exacerbated by the cognitive biases of regulators—such as 
confirmation bias, overoptimism.136 
B. DEEPER DIFFICULTIES AND MARKET SOLUTIONS 
An argument can be made that incentive problems only apply to 
individuals, and thus there should be no difficulty in designing some 
“measures of irrationality” to be published alongside other 
macroeconomic data.  Yet designing such a measure is not so simple.  
Not only would the knowledge and skill problems persist—and there are 
likely to be various interpretations of what measures are most 
appropriate—but the incentive problems, too, seem to run deeper. 
The official measures of inflation are a case in point.  Butler points 
out that in the UK, some years before the recent crisis, “Gordon Brown 
changed the price index that the Bank of England was to target to 
Consumer Price Index (CPI).  This excludes housing costs, unlike the 
Retail Prices Index, so the soaring cost of housing was not taken into 
account by the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC).”137 
Is government intervention needed? It seems that, prima facie, a 
market-based approach to debiasing and corrective information 
                                                                                                                                         
 134. On the theory of government and bureaucracy, see GORDON TULLOCK, THE 
VOTE MOTIVE 72 (Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard ed., rev. ed. 2006); WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, 
JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971). 
 135. See Michael Beenstock, Market Foundations for the New Financial 
Architecture, in VERDICT ON THE CRASH, supra note 73, at 59 (noting the incentive 
problems of regulators). Butler, supra note 75, at 56, is of similar opinion: “The Bank 
of England warned the FSA that Northern Rock was operating riskily in October 2006, 
long before it collapsed; but no effective action was taken.” 
 136. See infra Part VI. 
 137. Butler, supra note 75, at 56. 
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provision has several advantages.  In the private sector, there is arguably 
more professional competence, better access to relevant information, 
and simply more people doing the job.  Competition will tend to 
produce variety, innovation, and pressure to do a good job. 
A difficult question is whether there will be sufficient incentives for 
private actors to engage in a market-debiasing information provision. 
There is, however, reason to believe that some incentives exist.  Firstly, 
the long-term profitability of financial institutions demands that they 
seek to reduce the harmful effects of cognitive biases, at least internally.  
Secondly, it is also conceivable that firms could improve client 
satisfaction and loyalty—without suffering a significant loss of 
business—by helping them make better choices.  Thirdly, there are other 
actors, such as business newspapers and financial advisors, who could 
capitalize on the provision of better—including debiasing—information 
for financial decision makers.  Indeed, some have been doing so for 
quite a while and had good effect.138 
If public intervention seems appropriate, it should be limited to 
light-touch schemes such as incentivizing private actors and advertising 
the best privately-produced information for the general public.  
Regulatory authorities could also work with researchers in the field—
but without compromising their independence—who are in a better 
position to publicize contrarian views on markets.139  One could also 
consider creating an incentive scheme for financial supervisors, so that 
they would be awarded for correctly spotting weak signals in the 
economy; however, it is far from clear how to design such a scheme. 
IV. MARKET DISCIPLINE, EFFICIENCY, AND INNOVATION 
This part discusses a range of broad issues related to rationality and 
financial regulation: the role of market discipline, the notion of 
(informational) efficiency in financial markets, and the impact of 
financial innovation on regulatory strategy in the context of bounded 
rationality.  These are complex issues, so the discussion will necessarily 
be limited in scope.  The objective is to illustrate that although there are 
                                                                                                                                         
 138. This is not to deny that news media may at times suffer from the temptation to 
provide “what people want to hear” which may be different from they should hear. See 
SHILLER, supra note 50, at 102 (critically analyzing the financial media). 
 139. Naturally, it sometimes seems that regulators and politicians are more eager to 
promote academic research that presents a favorable picture of their activities. This 
creates a structural bias against contrarian research. 
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reasons to depart from the usual assumption of perfectly rational actors, 
more complex and intrusive regulation may not be the correct 
conclusion, and at least in some cases the opposite may be true. 
A. MARKET DISCIPLINE AND HEALTHY COMPETITION 
There has been plenty of debate on the extent to which market 
discipline—pressure, from shareholders and creditors, to operate 
profitably—are sufficient to keep market actors under control. Here the 
focus is on the narrower issue of whether stronger market discipline 
helps to mitigate problems arising from bounded rationality and 
willpower and, if so, what kind of rules and institutional arrangements 
facilitate market discipline. 
Although research is limited on this matter, an argument can be 
made that stronger competition and market discipline reduce the harmful 
effects of psychological bias.  Thus, better market players should win, 
and suboptimal decision-makers should lose.  It has been argued, 
therefore, that psychological anomalies—departures from optimal 
choice—should not be taken as a given, since they are influenced by 
social processes.140  For example, repetitive conditions facilitate learning 
from errors, and healthy competition tends to intensify valuable learning 
and the discovery of better habits of choice.141 
On the other hand, it may be argued that strong competition and 
market discipline sometimes create perverse incentives that exacerbate 
imperfect rationality. For example, business strategies that exploit 
anomalies may be reinforced by competitive conditions, which may 
explain the phenomenon of declining ethical and professional standards 
during boom periods.142  Gamble-for-life situations may also buttress 
some biases such as overoptimism. 
Market discipline and competition are never perfect, but in general 
terms it is conceivable that they are improved by lesser regulation and 
harmed by heavy regulatory intervention. Banking regulation is a case in 
                                                                                                                                         
 140. Bruno S. Frey & Reiner Eichenberger, Economic Incentives Transform 
Psychological Anomalies, 23 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 215, 215 (1994). 
 141. The latter point is supported by the theory of competition as a discovery 
process. See, e.g., ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 11–12 
(1973); William N. Butos & Roger G. Koppl, The Varieties of Subjectivism: Keynes 
and Hayek on Expectations, 29 HIST. POL. ECON. 327, 355 (1997). 
 142. See SHILLER, supra note 50, at 210–12 (noting that speculative bubbles are 
often accompanied by declining ethical standards until some scandal or crackdown 
comes about). 
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point. According to the standard version of the story, the collapse of 
institutions such as Lehman Brothers and Northern Rock was due to 
greedy bankers and not enough regulation—hence, more intensive and 
global regulation is needed. Unfortunately, that interpretation misses a 
big part of the picture. 
The modern banking system and the “too-big-to-fail syndrome” are 
not results of natural market dynamics. 143   In fact, an important 
contributing cause of these phenomena is the rise of increasingly 
complex banking regulation, the essence of which was to concentrate 
monitoring efforts in the hands of public authorities instead of, and at 
the expense of, primary stakeholders such as depositors and other 
lenders.  Instead of facilitating control and monitoring by the market, the 
existing regulatory paradigm has made the relationships between 
financial institutions and regulators paramount, leaving primary 
stakeholders out of the picture.144  Certainly in recent times, banks have 
made significant mistakes in their desire to innovate beyond the 
traditional model of prudent banking.  But one is forced to ask whether 
regulators were able to prevent this market failure, given that they were 
far behind the curve and had insufficient incentives (and possibly 
methods as well) to stop the phenomenon.145 
The better view seems to be that this lack of prudence was rendered 
possible by the inexistence of genuine monitoring and control by 
primary stakeholders, who were lulled into a false sense of security by 
the complexity of the regulatory system and the seemingly competent 
activity of regulators.146  As financial institutions now only report to 
their regulators and not to the public, more traditional banks will find it 
increasingly difficult to capitalize on their business model in the 
competitive environment.  This need not be so: 
Before depositors relied on government for protection, banks 
maintained much more substantial capital/asset ratios; in fact, banks 
                                                                                                                                         
 143. For criticism of the too-big-to-fail doctrine, see IMAD A. MOOSA, THE MYTH OF 
TOO BIG TO FAIL (2010). 
 144. See Ross Levine, The Corporate Governance of Banks: A Concise Discussion 
of Concepts and Evidence (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3404, 
2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=625281. 
 145. David T. Llewellyn, The Global Financial Crisis: The Role of Financial 
Innovation, in VERDICT ON THE CRASH, supra note 73, at 129. 
 146. HOWARD DAVIES & DAVID GREEN, GLOBAL FINANCIAL REGULATION: THE 
ESSENTIAL GUIDE 27 (2008). 
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used to advertise prominently the amount of their capital and 
surplus. But deposit insurance . . . has permitted banks to hold much 
lower, indeed, dangerously lower amounts of capital.147 
Finally, the coffin of market discipline was sealed by generous 
deposit insurance schemes, which, coupled with public bailouts, have 
largely externalized the costs of a crisis, thereby weakening the 
incentives of bankers to play safe.148  On the other hand, in some cases 
they have reduced to nil depositors’ incentives to find out where they 
put their money, promoting short-term profit-seeking and recklessness—
the rise and fall of Icelandic banks is a case in point.149 As Merton and 
Bodie have highlighted, the current global banking system combines 
demand-deposits with generous deposit insurance, making it 
systematically fragile and crisis-prone.  At the same time, it was 
controlled only by public supervisors, whose skills and incentives are 
relatively weak.150 
Thus, the regulatory paradigm of banking has weakened market 
discipline by promoting moral hazard across the board: it has facilitated 
the success of imprudent banking models and harmed the incentives of 
investors, depositors and other stakeholders to stay alert, be prudent, 
adopt good habits, and avoid biases such as overoptimism.  It is of 
course debatable what a less-interventionist or free-market banking 
system should look like, but it would certainly be very different from 
what we have today.  In light of behavioral theory, the system should be 
geared towards strengthening market discipline and healthy competition 
by promoting transparency to the public and incentives to act 
prudently. 151   While it is true that many people cannot understand 
                                                                                                                                         
 147. GEORGE J. BENSTON, REGULATING FINANCIAL MARKETS: A CRITIQUE AND 
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 148. Not all the costs of failure fall on taxpayers, because deposit insurance schemes 
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 149. See generally SPECIAL INVESTIGATION COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL 
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 150. Robert C. Merton & Zvi Bodie, Deposit Insurance Reform: A Functional 
Approach, in 38 CARNEGIE-ROCHESTER CONFERENCE SERIES ON PUBLIC POLICY 1 
(1993), available at http://www.people.hbs.edu/rmerton/DepositInsuranceReform.pdf. 
 151. See Kevin Dowd, Martin Hutchinson, Simon Ashby & Jimi M. Hinchliffe, 
Capital Inadequacies: The Dismal Failure of the Basel Regime of Bank Capital 
66 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
complex finance, the reintroduction of personal responsibility would 
provide market opportunities for simpler banks and discourage complex 
and opaque financial institutions. 
A debate exists on whether a free-market banking system should 
permit fractional reserve banking, or mandate a 100% reserve 
requirement for all demand deposits. 152   Naturally, the stricter view 
would imply that a great part of savings would be channeled to other 
investments, such as time deposits and money market funds instead of 
demand deposits.  The benefit, in terms of financial stability, would lie 
in the fact that these investment vehicles are not as crisis-prone as 
demand deposits. 153   Naturally, alternative investment channels may 
create their own problems, which have to be addressed separately.154 
B. IMPROVING MARKET EFFICIENCY AND STABILITY 
Related to the issue of competition and market discipline is the 
concept of (informational) market efficiency.  In simple terms, the idea 
of market efficiency is that market prices reflect all relevant 
information. 155   There are varying opinions on the extent to which 
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consistently builds on investor and personal responsibility, or a system that puts clear 
and inflexible limits on what banks can do. 
 152. See generally JESÚS HUERTA DE SOTO, MONEY, BANK CREDIT, AND ECONOMIC 
CYCLES 647 (3d ed. 2012). 
 153. See Jonathan R. Macey, Reducing Systemic Risk: The Role of Money Market 
Mutual Funds As Substitutes for Federally Insured Bank Deposits (Yale Law Sch. Ctr. 
for Studies in Law, Economics & Pub. Policy, Research Paper No. 422, 2011), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1735008. 
 154. See William A. Birdthistle, Breaking Bucks in Money Market Funds, 2010 WIS. 
L. REV. 1155, 1155 (arguing that the current U.S. rules relating to money market funds 
are likely to mislead investors and increase the likelihood of problems in the future). 
 155. There are different forms of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), which 
states that markets are informationally efficient. In its weak form, EMH says that asset 
prices reflect all past publicly available information. According to the semi-strong 
EMH, prices reflect all publicly available information and they instantly adjust to new 
public information. In the strong form, EMH claims that prices reflect hidden or insider 
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markets reflect informational efficiency, and the behavioral theory has 
been at the forefront of criticizing naïve theories of market efficiency.156  
The more relevant inquiry for the present discussion is the following: Is 
the relative inefficiency of many financial markets a reason to favor 
more regulation—or perhaps less? 
1. General Considerations 
There are at least two challenges to the view that inefficient 
markets call for increased regulation.  The first is that not all pricing 
inefficiencies are so significant that they merit public intervention, and 
the unintended costs of such intervention should be taken into account.  
The second challenge is that it may be difficult to improve the 
informational efficiency of markets in ways other than by promoting 
market innovations and improving market transparency.157 
Perhaps some rules ought to be changed and updated to reflect the 
current state of financial theory.  As an example, some argue that the 
fraud-on-the-market theory in U.S. securities law currently depends on 
flawed assumptions of market efficiency, and therefore it should be 
                                                                                                                                         
information too. There is little evidence for the strong form in most markets, but some 
evidence for the weak and semi-strong versions of EMH. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient 
Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970). 
 156. See Shiller, supra note 2, at 1–2 (providing evidence against the efficient 
market hypothesis); M. C. Findlay & E. E. Williams, A Fresh Look at the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis: How the Intellectual History of Finance Encouraged a Real 
“Fraud-on-the-Market,” 23 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 181 (2001) (arguing that 
evidence supporting the hypothesis was never very strong); Sanford J. Grossman & 
Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. 
ECON. REV. 393, 393 (1980) (arguing that prices cannot perfectly reflect all the 
available information, because that would imply that the return to gathering information 
is nil, and the market for information would collapse). But see Eugene F. Fama, Market 
Efficiency, Long-Term Returns, and Behavioral Finance, 49 J. FIN. ECON. 283 (1998) 
(discussing some of the literature and defending the efficient market hypothesis against 
critics). 
 157. Note, however, that in many cases pricing inefficiency may be caused by 
inflationary monetary policies; then, the issue is not regulation but misguided 
government policy. See Robert J. Shiller, Low Interest Rates and High Asset Prices: An 
Interpretation in Terms of Changing Popular Economic Models, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 13,558, 2007) (arguing that part of the problem is the 
money illusion as many people are not used to thinking in terms of the “real interest 
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changed to incorporate the findings of behavioral finance in determining 
reliance, materiality, causation and damages.158 
But, it seems less likely that increasing regulatory law is a 
warranted consequence of market inefficiencies.  For example, 
Langevoort argues that psychological biases, such as overoptimism, lead 
companies to falsely portray themselves to the public.159  He speculates 
that it might be possible to “debias” that tendency by changing the 
disclosure rules so that, among other things, “corporations wishing to 
avoid liability would have an incentive to bring into the disclosure 
process persons not subject (or less subject) to the same biases.”160  
There are however, two problems, which Langevoort himself points out.  
The first is that his proposal would be “extremely costly” and one 
should ask “whether biases built on overoptimism, at least, are ones with 
which we really want to interfere through legal intervention, even if we 
could.”161  The second is that there just may not be a problem that is 
worth solving: “Of course, market professionals and other savvy 
investors will discount many kinds of corporate hype, and, at least in 
those settings where efficiency properties predominate, such disclosures 
may have minimal market-price impact”.162 
There are, on the other hand, many reasons why market efficiency 
considerations may not justify heavy regulation—and indeed point 
towards less regulation.163  Shiller points out that we do not have much 
information about the long-term stabilizing effects of different rules in 
relation to regulations that restrict certain kinds of investments. 164  
Examples of apparently market-stabilizing rules include “circuit 
breakers” adopted by U.S. stock exchanges (i.e., shutting down markets 
                                                                                                                                         
 158. Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral 
Finance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 455, 456 (2006); Langevoort, supra note 59, at 176. 
 159. Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why 
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BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 144 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). 
 160. Id. at 157. 
 161. Id. at 158. 
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 163. It is interesting to note that in their popular book THE IMPACT OF PSYCHOLOGY 
ON GLOBAL CAPITALISM, AKERLOF AND SHILLER, supra note 1, propose basically no 
regulatory solutions to reduce the potential problems they perceive, although they do 
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 164. SHILLER, supra note 50, at 226–28. 
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in times of rapid price drops), and the “uptick rule” on short selling, 
imposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).165 
These measures only deal with very short-term price volatility, but 
policies that stabilize  such short-term market movements may not be so 
useful for addressing long-term mispricing—the more significant issue.  
Paradoxically, Shiller argues that sudden price changes may help 
markets to correct faster and avoid the illusion of safety during a 
speculative bubble.166  Short-term volatility is not always harmful, and 
in any case, the bursting of a speculative bubble is, on balance, a good 
thing, even if the corrective process is painful. 
2. Regulating Short Selling 
During the recent crisis, a wave of attacks on short selling emerged 
in the popular press on the basis that it destabilizes markets, and 
regulators across the globe imposed temporary bans on the short selling 
of stocks.167  Presently, many jurisdictions impose some restrictions or 
disclosure requirements on short selling.168  Are these concerns justified, 
and is regulation the appropriate reaction? 
The broad consensus in finance literature is that short selling 
generally promotes pricing efficiency. 169   Noted long-term value 
investors have also defended short selling: Klarman has argued that it 
provides a counterweight to the general bullishness of Wall Street,170 
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 167. See Sirri, supra note 165, at 525–31 (discussing various new rules imposed by 
the SEC in the U.S.); Alessandro Beber & Marco Pagano, Short-Selling Bans Around 
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while Warren Buffett maintains that there is a correlation between short 
selling and fraudulent accounting,171 suggesting that short sellers may 
help to uncover fraudulent accounting and related problems.  Even so-
called “naked short selling” 172 does not seem to be harmful according to 
a study by Boulton and Braga-Alves, who find no connection between 
the level of naked short selling and future stock declines: 
Our results suggest that the SEC’s recent regulatory actions 
restricting naked short selling may have been misplaced, as we find 
no evidence that naked short sellers are informed traders who 
exacerbate downward price momentum or are negatively viewed by 
the market. Instead, our results complement studies that suggest that 
naked short sellers promote efficient markets by providing liquidity 
in up markets, risk-bearing, and selling stocks they view as 
overpriced.173 
Thus, short selling is normally good from a behavioral viewpoint, 
because it allows contrarians to moderate speculative bubbles.  Indeed, 
one reason why the property market seems to be so prone to bubbles is 
that there are no convenient short selling opportunities.  Furthermore, 
short selling may be motivated by reasons other than expectations of 
price declines: such strategies as convertible bond arbitrage, hedging 
long positions with swaps or restricted stock, and statistical arbitrage all 
depend on short selling. 
There is a more plausible argument for restricting short selling 
during abnormal market conditions.  It is sometimes claimed that 
extreme conditions give rise to “disorderly” markets that become subject 
to “incoherence.”174  Such phenomena may be rational on the individual 
level if they are caused by the systemic consequences of widespread 
                                                                                                                                         
 171. See Rick Casterline, Berkshire Behind the Scenes: Part 5, MOTLEY FOOL (June 
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 173. Thomas J. Boulton & Marcus V. Braga-Alves, Naked Short Selling and Market 
Returns, 38 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 3, 133 (2012), available at 
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The U.K.’s Experience 2 (July 20, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1645847 
(quoting Sir Callum McCarthy and Hector Sants, the then Chairman and Chief 
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selling sprees giving rise to liquidity problems and unexpected margin 
calls, forcing investors to sell more and depressing prices further.  On 
the other hand, they may be reinforced by psychological factors, which 
can give rise to herd behavior and panics. 
Whatever the causes of disorderly markets, even this justification 
for short selling restrictions has been empirically called into question.  
One study using global data found that restrictions were generally 
detrimental to liquidity and failed to lift stock prices.175  In the U.S., 
another study concluded that the SEC ban on short sales in 2008–09 
may have inflated financial stock values by 10–12%,176 but this has been 
challenged by those who argue that the price increase was likely due to 
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which was announced 
alongside the short selling ban.177  In fact, it was later found that there 
was no positive price effect in stocks that could not be sold short.178 
In the UK, Marsh and Payne investigated the effects of the ban on 
short sales of financial firms in 2008–09, using information on the full 
order book for these stocks immediately before and after the ban.179  The 
authors found that the ban did not stop the aggressive sell-off of the 
financials as compared with non-financials, but it did greatly reduce 
their trading volume and order book liquidity.180  Thus, market quality 
for the financials deteriorated further, making trading in financial stocks 
more expensive and less attractive.181 
It seems, then, that if there are good reasons for markets to crash, 
they crash with or without short sellers.  Only in exceptional situations 
can short selling make things worse, but it is difficult to know when that 
is the case.  Price overshooting is generally caused by a different set of 
factors, including liquidity problems among investors and uncertainty 
caused by lack of transparency.  Note also that the lack of short selling 
opportunities in the housing market has not prevented an ongoing price 
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decline; the adjustment process may take longer, but that too has its 
costs in terms of longer lasting uncertainty. 
Finance theory’s empirical support for short selling has led some 
commentators to seek alternative explanations for the existence of short 
selling regulations.  Sirri argues that the sudden increase in short selling 
restrictions in 2008–09 was more due to regulatory politics than sound 
economics.182 The SEC—which is financially dependent on Congress 
and whose Commissioners are presidential appointees confirmed by 
Congress—was under significant political pressure after the failure of 
major financial firms and the exposing of Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi 
scheme, and had to be seen as “doing something.”183  Duncan Niederaur, 
head of NYSE Euronext, even stated that while “there was no economic 
benefit” from having the uptick rule, “it would go a long way to adding 
confidence.”184  If the uptick rule truly does increase market confidence, 
then perhaps that can be called a behavioral argument in favor of the 
uptick rule! 
From a behavioral perspective, attacks on short selling may be 
understood as a type of scapegoating, rooted in the self-serving 
attribution bias. People are keen to find an explanation and someone to 
blame. Moreover, it may seem unfair that someone profits when others 
lose.185 
3. Other Possibilities 
It is interesting that Robert Shiller, one of the foremost critics of 
naïve believers in market efficiency, nevertheless supports freer 
financial markets.  The primary reason is that price bubbles are so 
complex and changing that we cannot understand how to deal with them 
                                                                                                                                         
 182. Sirri, supra note 165, at 531–36. 
 183. Id. 
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effectively.  Interfering with markets is likely to work poorly in most 
cases, and it will have significant costs and unintended consequences: 
Unfortunately, the nature of the bubbles is sufficiently complex and 
changing that we can never expect to document the particular role of 
any given policy in bringing about our objective long-term economic 
welfare. Policies that interfere with markets by shutting down or 
limiting them, although under some very specific circumstances 
apparently useful, probably should not be high on our list of 
solutions to the problems caused by speculative bubbles. Speculative 
markets perform critical resource-allocation functions . . . and any 
interference with markets to tame bubbles interferes with these 
functions as well.186 
Therefore, instead of increasing regulation, “most of the thrust of 
our national policies to deal with speculative bubbles should take the 
form of facilitating more free trade, as well as greater opportunities for 
people to take positions in more and freer markets”.187  This suggests 
other policies, such as setting up new markets that facilitate better 
pricing.  One example is the “S&P 500 Strips” concept that consists of 
“a market for the future annual total dividends of the aggregate S&P 500 
firms for each year in the future up to some distant horizon.”188  Such a 
market would provide an incentive for analysts to focus on forecasting 
dividends, which is more reflective of fundamental strength than market 
prices.  Shiller has also proposed the creation of a derivatives market for 
home prices to improve pricing efficiency.189 
Perhaps the biggest challenge is helping people adopt habits that 
reduce the harmful effects of speculative bubbles.  Shiller advocates 
better diversification, more personal saving, and hedging of personal 
risks.190  Some of these might be achieved voluntarily or through light-
touch regulations that help people make better choices without 
compulsion.191  For example, one could increase savings by promoting 
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schemes such as the Save More Tomorrow (SMarT) program. 192  
Diversifying beyond national equity markets could be encouraged by 
education, advice, and better access to different markets.  Hedging of 
personal economic risks would only require marginally more creative 
thinking by financial advisors and other professionals.193 
C. INNOVATION AND REGULATION 
Undoubtedly, many problems have been caused by imprudent 
innovation in financial markets.194  Indeed, some prominent economists 
have questioned the value of financial innovation itself.195  What does 
this imply for regulation?  Innovation and its adverse effects are to some 
extent an inherent aspect of the trial and error discovery process of 
market economics, but psychological factors such as overconfidence and 
overoptimism may exacerbate the harm.  It may be that regulatory 
intervention is needed to restrain socially harmful innovation. 
However, there are at least three reasons why the issue is more 
complicated. Firstly, some problems of financial innovation may be 
mitigated through light-touch regulations along behavioral lines. 196  
Secondly, imprudent innovations may be encouraged by lack of personal 
responsibility for failures, a situation that has arguably been worsened 
by the replacement of market-based discipline with increased public 
supervision.197  Thirdly and most importantly, it may be that problematic 
innovation is often driven by faulty overregulation. 
This last point requires a closer look.  It has been claimed that a 
major impulse for financial innovation is the desire to avoid taxes and 
regulation.198  Some of that activity may be beneficial, but it causes a 
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cat-and-mouse game whereby substantial resources are wasted and the 
regulatory environment is in a constant state of flux.  Recurring 
problems in the banking sector serve as prominent examples and suggest 
that overregulation tends to cause unintended consequences in the form 
of dubious innovations. 
Consider bank capital regulation.  For years, experts have argued 
that capital adequacy regulation based on the Basel Capital Accords has 
been a failure.199  Although well-intentioned, it has in practice stifled the 
development of risk management by preventing valuable competition in 
risk management systems.200  Moreover, instead of producing a sensible 
system, the Basel rules have given banks an increasingly lengthy 
rulebook that lacks basic principles and common sense.  This has led to 
a compliance culture, which is especially problematic when the rules are 
flawed. And flawed they are: Basel II allows banks to use their own risk 
models based on the Value at Risk (VaR) concept—a defective risk 
measure that has been discredited for quite some time for failing to 
include “tail risks”.201  A “tail risk” is a form of portfolio risk that arises 
when the possibility that an investment will move more than three 
standard deviations from the mean is greater than what is shown by a 
normal distribution.202  The current regulatory system, combined with 
imperfect product competition and the too big to fail problem, has 
fostered a market in complex products such as subprime loans and credit 
derivatives.  These markets have large tail risks, and hence “have the 
appearance of producing very high alphas (high returns for low risk), so 
managers have an incentive to load up on them. Every once in a while, 
however, they will blow up.”203 
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Imperfect banking regulation may be the driving force of dubious 
financial innovations.204  Instead of enhancing stability, the risk-based 
capital regulation of Basel II has created a pro-cyclical system, which 
forces banks to increase their lending just at the point where the risk of a 
systematic downturn is greatest, making crises more likely and more 
severe.205  Moreover, it has not mitigated bounded rationality, but has 
only increased overoptimism and over-confidence: 
The models first of all hide the underlying risks but, also, the 
encouragement to use quantitative models gives management false 
comfort that the risks of complex balance sheets, which are beyond 
anybody’s understanding, can be modelled in a precise way. 
Management and shareholders therefore become more comfortable 
than they otherwise would with complex financial exposures.206 
The recently agreed upon Basel III framework will arguably 
introduce modest improvements, but the overall philosophy remains the 
same, and thus the fundamental problems are not addressed.207 
Some response is needed.  It may well be that stricter rules would 
be better.  For example, so-called “narrow banking” rules which would 
separate demand deposits and the payment system from high finance, 
risky derivatives, and opaque off-balance sheet investments may be 
beneficial.208  The principal argument for narrow banking rests on the 
inherent instability of demand deposits, the perverse incentives created 
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by deposit insurance, and the large social costs of bailing out banks.209  
However, narrow banking is unlikely to be a perfect solution.210 
The argument here is that future regulation should focus on 
increasing market-based oversight and reducing complex legal rules that 
financial institutions can rig in their favor by way of socially wasteful 
innovation.  We should not underestimate the ability of market 
participants to come up with novel institutional solutions to deal with 
the abuse of innovation when they are empowered and charged with the 
responsibility of doing so.  Indeed, “stock exchanges, professional 
standards, industry codes of conduct and rating agencies all exist to 
help, in their different ways, overcome problems caused by information 
asymmetries and the incentives to reckless behaviour that limited 
liability can provide.”211  In addition, regulatory intervention in market-
based mechanisms may create perverse incentives, as the history of 
credit ratings demonstrates.212 
 
V. BEHAVIORAL BUREAUCRATS: PSYCHOLOGY  
AND REGULATORY FAILURE 
 
Regulators and politicians are not free from behavioral biases.213  
This is not an automatic reason to rule out regulation, but it causes us to 
rethink the appropriate role of regulatory intervention.214  So far, the 
implications of behavioral theory for regulators and legislators have 
attracted limited attention.  According to one survey of articles in 
behavioral economics, more than 20% made some sort of policy 
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recommendation, but of these, 95.5% contained no analysis whatsoever 
of the cognitive abilities of policymakers.215 
It is widely acknowledged that, just as markets may fail, regulators 
may fail too. 216   Regulatory rule-makers suffer from informational 
problems as well as incentive problems; they frequently lack sufficient 
skills; regulation is prone to rent-seeking behavior and capture of 
regulation by regulatees; the costs of regulation may be higher than the 
benefits, and many of the costs are hidden or indirect; legal rules suffer 
from gaps and ambiguities; regulation tends to lag behind, especially 
when the environment is rapidly changing; and regulation often fails to 
achieve its purpose, as regulatees find innovate ways to avoid the effect 
of regulation.217  The list could go on. 
What follows is a consideration of the impact of psychology on 
regulation and legislation, and how that should be borne in mind when 
designing regulation and regulatory institutions.  A difficult question is 
to what extent psychology contributes to certain observed phenomena.  
As will be seen, ordinarily public choice theory and behavioral 
economics may be seen as complementary explanations.  Not only do 
both public choice and behavioral theory highlight reasons for 
regulatory failure, but the effects predicted by these theories may also be 
mutually reinforcing.218  For example, “cognitive biases may encourage 
regulators to equate self-interest and the public interest.”219  However, 
we cannot isolate one effect from the other, so the significance of the 
difference factors remains uncertain. 
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A. REGULATORY FAILURE: BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVES 
To begin, behavioral theory implies that regulation tends to be 
reactive instead of proactive.  Rule makers suffer from availability and 
hindsight biases, causing undue importance to be given to recent and 
immediate information.  One result of these biases is that large scandals 
tend to be interpreted under the assumption that abuse is the norm.220   
With hindsight, all crises seem to have been inevitable, and regulatory 
intervention appears indispensable.  This will be reinforced by political 
pressure, as politicians and regulatory authorities feel that they need to 
be seen “doing something” about the problems.  The pressure is even 
greater if legislators and regulators can blame some specific group and 
direct attention away from misguided regulations.221 
If regulators overreact to crises, they are also likely to err on the 
side of omission during good times; thus a pro-cyclical regulatory 
tendency is generated. 222   Indeed, it seems that overoptimism, 
availability bias, and the tendency to underestimate small probabilities 
imply that regulators and legislators tend to ignore real problems that 
have not yet surfaced.  An example is the failure of most experts to 
foresee problems caused by the abuse of complex derivative 
instruments, or the abuse of credit ratings.  Indeed, some warned about 
these problems, but the warnings were not heeded by regulators any 
more than by most market participants. 
The joint effect of these biases is reactive regulation, which 
addresses specific issues that are in fact unlikely to reappear in the same 
form, as market participants learn from the past and adapt their 
behavior. Thus, regulation often fails to address general problems 
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proactively by improving the system as a whole.  A consequence of this 
tendency is the accumulation of a patchwork set of rules lacking a 
principled basis.  From the viewpoint of boundedly rational market 
participants, this is especially problematic, because it becomes difficult 
to understand the regulatory system, and investors may choose to rely on 
regulators for protection when in fact some areas of the market are not 
so regulated. 
It is difficult to empirically assess the extent to which the problems 
identified here are realized in practice.  After the recent financial crisis it 
appeared as though lawmakers were trying to renew the entire 
regulatory landscape, but a closer look shows that these changes might 
have only been an attempt to impress the electorate while keeping 
fundamentals the same. 223   Of course, it may be argued that the 
fundamentals should remain as before; the point is that the impression of 
major reform may be illusory. 
Secondly, behavioral theory suggests a tendency to overregulate 
and a failure to rectify mistakes. One reason is that regulators and 
politicians are subject to overconfidence bias, which may lead them to 
overestimate their understanding of the issues and their ability to resolve 
them. 224   Overconfidence seems to be especially common among 
experts, which implies that regulators are likely to be especially prone to 
it.225 
Regulators are also subject to confirmation bias, which implies that 
evidence supporting existing rules will tend to be highlighted, while 
negative evidence will easily be ignored.  Confirmation bias is likely to 
be especially significant in relation to financial markets regulation, 
because it “will be more pronounced if the evidence is more complex 
and subject to conflict inferences, a fair characterization of most 
regulatory problems in the securities markets.”226 
Overconfidence and confirmation bias may mutually strengthen 
each other, and both are significant obstacles to sound regulatory 
reform.  Self-serving bias may augment this obstacle, as rule makers 
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 225. Griffin and Tversky, supra note 37, at 427–30; Rabin, supra note 29, at 31–32. 
 226. Choi and Pritchard, supra note 5, at 30. 
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overestimate their role in managing crises (when in reality, a crisis may 
have been resolved naturally) and underestimate their role in causing 
crises or making them worse. 
Framing effects may have a similar consequence.  Loss aversion 
will lead rule-makers to give more importance to potential crises than to 
the benefits of more lightly regulated regimes.  The opportunity cost 
bias implies that explicit and measurable costs will be given prominence 
at the expense of hidden, indirect and long-term costs of overregulation.  
Status quo bias will reinforce the tendency of regulators to stick to 
existing rules unless their criticism is overwhelming. 
Also note that because financial rule makers are not always 
rational, even well-intentioned regulators tend to come up with 
imperfect solutions.  In particular, regulations tend to suffer from 
“bounded search” and “tunnel vision,” which lead to a lack of creative 
thinking.227  For example, the SEC has tended to treat disclosure rules as 
a cure-all regulatory strategy despite the fact that—especially in light of 
behavioral economics—it may not be so effective, at least if the focus is 
merely on large amounts of disclosure. 228   The persistent failure of 
banking regulation is another example.  Bounded search and tunnel 
vision again imply that regulatory reform tends to be limited to tinkering 
with the details instead of a genuine rethinking of regulatory principles. 
There may, of course, be good reasons for both overregulation and 
the failure to remedy past mistakes.  Given the imperfection of all 
rulemaking, it is sometimes better to err on the side of overregulation 
rather than underregulation, at least if significant risks are present.  The 
failure to reform an imperfect system may also be motivated by 
regulatory switching costs (i.e., the costs to both regulators and 
regulatees resulting from changing the rules of the game), as well as the 
reasonable suspicion that a different rulebook might not lead to much 
improvement.  On the other hand, awareness of these issues may 
reinforce the biases discussed earlier. 
B. HIDDEN BEHAVIORAL COSTS OF REGULATION 
The behavioral theory also shows that in addition to the explicit 
costs of compliance, regulation may also give rise to hidden costs.  One 
such hidden cost is the consequent reduction in carefulness and 
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monitoring by market participants themselves; carefulness here includes 
the attempt to mitigate the effects of one’s cognitive imperfections. 
It is very difficult to quantify this effect, but its existence should 
not be ignored.  Firstly, protective regulatory schemes may create an 
illusion of security and safety, thereby encouraging overoptimism bias 
among market participants.  Regulation may lead investors to rely too 
much on public protection, and their attempts to make wise choices—
and overcome their own behavioral biases—are weakened as a result.229  
The problem may be greatest precisely after crises, as legislators and 
regulators want to send the signal that they are in charge, they know 
how to deal with the issues, and they will in fact do so effectively.  
Paradoxically, the more successfully they transmit this message, the 
more they inhibit the necessary learning process and behavioral 
adaptation that ought to take place after a crisis.  People may want to 
trust in the ability of public authorities to protect their interests, but 
blind trust in reforms is frequently misplaced. 
Secondly, extensive regulation tends to give rise to the 
accumulation of complex rulebooks that lack consistency and clear 
principles.  The consequence for market participants is that it becomes 
harder to understand the rules, and therefore more difficult to personally 
assess the limits and defects of the regulatory system.  Thus blind 
reliance and dependency are inadvertently promoted.  That can be 
especially harmful when, in reality, some areas of financial markets are 
less regulated and market participants would be advised to tread 
carefully. 
Complexity and high regulatory costs may also give rise to a 
different kind of hidden cost.  As the regulatory burden becomes 
significant, regulatory subjects may resort to a compliance culture, only 
fulfilling the letter of the regulations and ignoring the underlying 
principles.230   Especially when regulatees feel they are being treated 
unfairly, they will tend to respond with spiteful behavior, thereby 
making the job of regulatory authorities as difficult as possible.  In the 
worst-case scenario, a vicious circle is created: as regulation is tightened 
                                                                                                                                         
 229. Id. at 6–7. See also Henry T. C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and 
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2012] THE BEHAVORIAL PARADOX AND REGULATION 83 
and complicated, the compliance culture is deepened, and all market 
participants become increasingly dependent on regulators to protect their 
interests.  It would seem that the better option is to find a set of simple 
and principled rules that are perceived as fair, that punish abuse harshly, 
and that are primarily enforced by market participants.231 
C. INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS 
Behavioral theory thus suggests that there tends to be too many 
rules based on reactive and overreaching regulation, and past regulatory 
mistakes are only rarely corrected.  This phenomenon is quite natural 
and there is no doubt that we all suffer from similar biases in our daily 
life.  The point is not to criticize regulators and legislators for being 
human, but to investigate what kind of regulatory approaches are 
appropriate and how regulatory quality could be improved given the 
imperfections of human beings.  Regulatory quality is a broad topic that 
can only be briefly discussed here.  There are numerous ways in which 
regulatory quality can be improved, including better regulatory 
oversight, training in regulatory quality skills, policy coherence, 
evaluation, simplification, and consultation.232 
More specifically in the context of behavioral economics, Choi and 
Pritchard point out, using the SEC as an example, that there are some 
potentially corrective mechanisms in place at regulatory authorities.233  
For example, hierarchical review of staff proposals by commissioners 
may reduce bias caused by overconfidence and overoptimism. 234  
Judicial review and political oversight may have a similar effect.235  One 
can see similar processes in the context of legislation: political review of 
draft legislation will improve the scrutiny of proposals, which as a result 
have to be better defended.  The role of outside experts in the drafting 
process should also improve the quality of legislation.236  However, the 
overall effect is unclear.  Reviewers and experts are subject to similar 
psychological biases, and their involvement will entail unwanted costs, 
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so it is certainly not correct to conclude that these additional procedures 
should be increased without measure.  Moreover, complex procedures 
will make it more difficult to challenge the status quo, and the influence 
of political pressures may exacerbate the reactive nature of regulation. 
McDonnell and Schwarcz advance a related idea, which they call 
regulatory contrarians.237  They advocate the institutionalization of roles 
whose function is to challenge the status quo of regulation by 
identifying its weaknesses. 238   According to these authors, some 
government bodies already perform this function, but it would be 
possible to have more of them.  However, regulatory contrarians mainly 
help to identify weaknesses in existing rules, not so much to reduce 
reactive regulation.  Moreover, an important regulatory contrarian role is 
already played by (some) academics. 
Another way of improving the quality of regulation is the use of 
regulatory impact assessments (RIAs) or cost-benefit analyses (CBAs).  
RIAs are a way of critically assessing the positive and negative effects 
of proposed or existing regulations and their non-regulatory alternatives.  
In principle, impact assessments should help reduce the harmful effects 
of various psychological biases by forcing law makers to face the facts 
and consider different options. 
In practice, things are not so simple.  In addition to being expensive 
to produce, RIAs are usually done ex ante—before the regulation is 
implemented—when there are few hard facts to rely on.239  As a result, 
RIAs tend to be highly speculative, and biases such as salience and 
overoptimism are likely to reduce the quality of the analysis further, 
especially if those making the RIA are favorable to the proposed 
regulation.240  Another challenge is that if the RIA concludes against the 
proposed regulation, that analysis may simply be ignored: “Viewed 
objectively, these efforts have not been a success.  The RIAs, and 
                                                                                                                                         
 237. McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 215. 
 238. Id. 
 239. See THE IMPACT OF LEGISLATION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF EX ANTE 
EVALUATION (Jonathan Verschuuren ed. 2009) (providing critical assessments of ex 
ante evaluation of legislation). 
 240. See, e.g., EUR. COMMISSION, IMPACT ASSESSMENT BOARD REPORT FOR THE 
YEAR 2007 (2008), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? 
uri=CELEX:52008SC0120:EN:NOT (“In a number of cases, there was a bias in the 
definition of options towards the preferred option, often leading to an analysis of 
options that was too much focussed on the preferred option while other options should 
have been explored in greater detail.”). 
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similar efforts, often are no more than form-filling exercises in support 
of a government department’s preferred legalistic approach, rather than 
genuine attempts to identify the most efficient regulation.”241 
These problems might be mitigated through ex post—after the 
regulation is implemented—impact assessments.  Regulation frequently 
has unintended consequences, and ex post analysis helps to critically 
evaluate the success of past action.  Indeed, ex post impact assessment 
of regulation is frequently conducted by academics in law and 
economics. However, one should not expect too much.  Impact 
assessments are important, but even ex post analysis remains subject to 
biases such as salience and the confirmation bias (ideology plays a role, 
too); the causal connections are subject to dispute even after the fact.  
Besides, there are practical difficulties in trying to change the rules 
through ex post assessments: once the issue is settled, political interest 
tends to diminish, and the prospect of further switching costs reduces the 
attractiveness of changing the status quo.  One proposal worth 
developing further is to “‘sunset’ (end) the rule adoption after a number 
of years, so that its merits would need to be reargued, in part using the 
data generated from the initial rule adoption.”242 
D. PRINCIPLES 
Overall, three general conclusions may be inferred. Firstly, there is 
reason to be skeptical of regulatory intervention.  This means favoring 
general principles instead of complex regulations.  Crises should not 
lead to sudden changes; instead it is necessary to study the ways in 
which existing regulations have not only failed to prevent some 
problems, but have also contributed to them.  Moreover, regulatory 
authorities should be given fewer discretionary powers, and their 
delegated rulemaking powers should be limited.243 
Secondly, regulatory intervention should—despite recent 
criticism—generally prefer light-touch regulations, which influence the 
decisions of market participants without unduly restricting their 
choices.244  This is because behaviorally inspired light-touch regulations 
are less likely to create major costs, even when they are imperfect.245 
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Some possibilities include default rules, psychologically designed 
disclosure, and cooling-off periods.246  There is also the possibility of 
educating individuals, not just on finance, but also on typical behavioral 
biases and how to moderate them.247  This need not involve regulatory 
authorities; the market is already flooded with information on behavioral 
economics, and some financial intermediaries have an incentive to 
educate their clients in order to boost client loyalty. 
Thirdly, the behavioral biases of regulators suggest that regulatory 
competition should be fostered, because “while market biases 
continually face the pressure of competition, behavioral biases among 
regulators may go unchecked if regulators enjoy monopoly authority.”248  
Thus the behavioral view questions the trend towards global regulation. 
One option is to reconsider the possibilities of self-regulation and 
enforced self-regulation. 249   Another option is to find ways of 
empowering market participants, possibly through well-designed 
disclosure rules.250 
VI. LEARNING AND THE VALUE OF SIMPLICITY 
The value of general principles and simplicity has already been 
mentioned in various ways. This part rounds up the discussion by 
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highlighting some further behavioral arguments that favor a system of 
simple rules over complex regulatory regimes.251  As a former Chief 
Economist of the SEC has pointed out, much of complexity of modern 
finance is a consequence of the complexity of regulation.252 
Note that in any case it is neither conceivable nor necessary to 
create a perfect regulatory system.  Many problems in existing markets 
have been caused by flawed regulations and unsound monetary policy, 
and it is difficult to say how markets would have evolved but for the 
distorted incentives created by existing rules.  There are behavioral 
anomalies, but their practical importance in different contexts is less 
clear.  Behavioral perfectionism in financial regulation could become a 
nightmare, because it might lead to major implementation costs and 
unintended consequences.  Besides, “many of the anomalies discovered 
are beyond the power of regulation—public or private—to affect.”253 
A. HABITS, LEARNING, AND RESPONSIBILITY 
We should not ignore the importance of good habits—including 
moral habits or virtues—that enable people to make good choices.254 
The tendency in regulatory debates is to focus on external rules, because 
the focus is on what public authorities can do to solve social problems. 
There is a danger of forgetting that personal virtues such as prudence—
the perfected ability of free and rational persons to make wise practical 
decisions255—cannot be replaced by regulation.  Good habits must be 
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learnt in life, and an important role in this learning process is played by 
families, schools, churches and, quite simply, the freedom of making 
personal choices and being responsible for the consequences. 
During financial crises, the emphasis tends to be on the failure of 
regulation, and especially on the failure of public authorities to protect 
individuals from bad choices.  This emphasis can go too far if it ignores 
the role of personal responsibility for free choices, including morally 
wrong choices.  As Samuel Gregg has emphasized, analysts of financial 
crises have heavily criticized investment banks, often rightly, but “rather 
fewer moral critiques have been made of the behaviour of individuals 
who, for example, misrepresented—i.e., lied—about their assets, income 
and liabilities in order to obtain loans and mortgages.”256 
One implication is that personal responsibility needs to be given 
more importance. Market participants should be allowed to make some 
mistakes and learn from them.  But it is even more important that they 
are made aware of their responsibility for the choices they make.  The 
danger of extensive regulatory schemes is that they may reduce investor 
prudence over time, and thereby create an artificial justification for 
increasingly protective and expensive regulations: 
[E]ven inexperienced and cognitively challenged investors are 
capable of learning. Once freed of the responsibility and discipline 
of making investment decisions, investors lose the feedback 
mechanism that facilitates such learning. Indeed, some investors may 
come to believe (overoptimistically) that regulatory protections fully 
insulate them from investment risks. When this is not true . . . 
investors with overconfidence in the power of regulation will then 
take even less care and may face a greater risk of facing large 
financial losses as a result.257 
The loss of self-protection is perhaps most manifest in the banking 
sector, where market discipline has been consistently waning due to its 
replacement by public regulation: “Market signalling mechanisms can 
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also be crowded out by regulation and government guarantees: why does 
it matter if a bank is trustworthy or has a high level of capital if the 
regulator exists to look after such things and the government will 
provide guarantees if things go wrong?”258 
It is not necessary for people to make perfect choices: what matters 
is that people are able to adopt good enough habits and rules of thumb 
that facilitate their choosing in a complex financial world: 
It is often thought that many borrowers are too unsophisticated to act 
with prudence and that they need to be protected by regulation. 
Though prudence requires people to become informed, this need not 
involve becoming immersed in complex technical information. 
Tradition, rules of thumb and the observation of the behaviour of 
other sensible people have worked for many generations as a more 
than adequate control mechanism for keeping personal borrowing 
under control.259 
A stable and principled legal framework that emphasizes clear lines 
of responsibility fosters good habits and sensible rules of thumb.  In 
contrast, the learning process is hampered by a constantly changing 
regulatory environment—such as in periods after crises—which renders 
it difficult to learn from past mistakes.260   There is also the risk of 
renewing the false illusion of effective oversight, as a former head of the 
UK Financial Services Authority has admitted: 
They [financial supervisors] should also be cautious in describing 
the limits of their ambitions, both in terms of the degree of security 
they can offer to those who transact with financial institutions, and in 
terms of the scale or scope of the supervision they undertake. A 
regulator which claims too much will weaken market discipline, 
which can often be a more effective tool than regulatory 
intervention.261 
                                                                                                                                         
 258. Booth, supra note 211, at 162. 
 259. Gregg, Moral Failure, supra note 254, at 148. 
 260. See Spatt, supra note 242, at 7 (“[E]xcess complexity in the formulation of a 
regulation can be a serious impediment to the generation of meaningful evidence.”). 
 261. DAVIES & GREEN, supra note 146, at 27. See also Fingers in the Dike: What 
Regulators Should Know, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 11, 2010, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/15474107 (noting that the plans to create a systemic 
regulator have made some commentators worried about the false comfort it might 
create); Alex J. Pollock, Is a “Systemic Risk Regulator” Possible?, THE AMERICAN 
(May 12, 2009), http://american.com/archive/2009/may-2009/is-a-2018systemic-risk-
regulator2019-possible (analyzing the pros and cons of a systemic regulator). 
90 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
When regulatory reform is necessary, it should focus on clear 
principles that people can understand.  Lengthy and technical 
regulations tend to alienate ordinary people—and many financial 
professionals—from the regulatory system, thereby promoting a 
psychology of dependency and carelessness.  Given cognitive 
imperfections and the use of rules of thumb, drastic changes in the 
operating environment create problems, especially when the 
implications of those changes are not easily foreseeable.  It is likely that 
part of the market failure during the recent crisis was due to the rapid 
expansion of forceful incentive schemes in banking, which traditionally 
has been a rather conservative industry.262  In light of behavioral theory, 
significant changes cause problems not only because of a lack of 
information on their consequences, but also because habits, conventions, 
and rules of thumb, which functioned well in an earlier setting, may 
prove to be obsolete. 
B. SMALL CRISES AND THE VIRTUES OF DECENTRALISM 
Less regulation might result in more crises, but smaller ones.  On 
balance, more frequent small crises might be advantageous to having 
huge crises every one or two decades.  This is because crises that took 
place in the more distant past tend to be forgotten, their learning effect 
wears away over time, and people become more careless and tend to 
repeat past mistakes.263  In contrast, more frequent smaller crises would 
maintain the caution and prudence that should always form part of 
financial market participation, and there would be faster learning from 
mistakes on both personal and institutional levels: 
[T]he idea is not to correct mistakes and eliminate randomness from 
social and economic life through monetary policy, subsidies, and so 
on. The idea is simply to let human mistakes and miscalculations 
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remain confined, and to prevent their spreading through the system . 
. . . Reducing volatility and ordinary randomness increases exposure 
to Black Swans—it creates an artificial quiet.264 
Similarly, behavioral theory implies that it might be better to have 
many different regulatory systems and policies—not only because that 
would reduce the harmful effect of behavioral biases among regulators, 
but also because of positive learning effects.  Regulatory variation would 
promote trial and error, and it would make it easier for boundedly 
rational people to discover what works and what does not. 
This view goes against conventional wisdom.  According to the 
standard account of recent problems in financial markets, the failure of 
regulatory systems was mainly due to the inability of national regulators 
to rein in free markets, which were therefore allowed to run wild and 
cause havoc around the globe.  The solution, the theory goes, is to 
establish a global financial regulator with powers to make rules and 
enforce them around the world in cooperation with national regulators. 
There are serious problems with this account.  Note, for example, 
that one major area of regulatory failure has been bank capital adequacy 
regulation, which is already essentially global in scope.265  Accounting 
regulation is also increasingly international, but that has done nothing to 
reduce the problem of misleading reporting of financial derivative 
positions; arguably, the highly politicized nature of international 
rulemaking has only made it more difficult to come up with a sensible 
solution to the issue.266  It would be worthwhile to reconsider greater 
regulatory competition.267 
It is debatable whether lack of coordination among regulatory 
authorities caused any of the real issues.  Lack of cooperation was only 
an issue to the extent that the regulatory mechanisms were basically 
sound, but national regulators simply did not have sufficient information 
and powers to act.  The regulatory-critical view of the crisis challenges 
that interpretation, and the theory of “behavioral bureaucrats” makes its 
case even weaker. 268  Indeed, some types of financial risk regulation 
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have given rise to destructive coordination,  While standardization and 
coordination may lower transaction costs, in the context of financial 
markets it has also magnified pro-cyclical market processes. 269  
According to this view, the regulatory standardization of risk 
management techniques and measures (including general bank capital 
regulation and the infamous Value-at-Risk concept) has caused market 
participants to act in unison and to make the same mistakes together, 
thereby magnifying the likelihood of systemic crises.270 
More importantly, the creation of global regulatory elites would 
exacerbate the behavioral problems discussed earlier: their special status 
would likely bolster overconfidence bias, and they would be even less 
subject to real checks and balances so that unfounded regulatory 
activism would be encouraged.  Moreover, while there are benefits to 
regulatory unity, more unified (but imperfect) regulation would then 
impede trial and error learning processes and likely give rise to bigger 
and more global crises, as the same mistakes would be made by 
everybody at the same time. 
CONCLUSION 
It has been argued that, contrary to a common perception, 
behavioral economics does not provide a blanket theory for increasingly 
paternalistic regulation of financial markets.  Even if behavioral 
economics is taken at face value (which it need not be) the implications 
are entirely different.  Many problems due to behavioral biases and 
anomalies can be mitigated through light-touch regulations, and freer 
markets tend to promote better market discipline and more accurate 
pricing. 271  There are also doubts about the real significance of 
psychological biases, especially as many problems are caused by flawed 
regulations that create harmful incentives. 272  Moreover, behavioral 
theory implies that we should be more skeptical about the ability of rule 
makers to correctly perceive the real problems and to find the 
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appropriate remedies.273   Finally, regulatory complexity and constant 
change exacerbate the harmful effects of bounded rationality. 274 
This should not be taken to mean that behavioral economics calls 
for complete deregulation.  There may be reasons (other than behavioral 
biases) why regulation is needed.  The question is not simply about 
more or less regulation, but also about the manner of regulation.  The 
thesis is that, when there are reasons to regulate, the regulatory 
strategies should avoid complexity; highlight clear lines of 
responsibility; emphasize market discipline; shun regulatory 
centralization; distrust regulators; and avoid constant changes to the 
rulebook. 
There remain numerous possibilities for further research.  On the 
empirical front, much work remains to be done in order to assess the 
practical importance of behavioral biases and to test the workability of 
behaviorally-inspired regulations.275  In addition, it would be interesting 
to see empirical studies on the question of public choice theory versus 
behavioral bureaucrats, as an attempt to isolate the relative effects of 
each factor by a comparative study of different institutional settings. 
Another important question is how the analysis would be affected 
by the inclusion of fairness behavior and moral psychology.276  It might 
challenge some of the conclusions of the present Article, because 
highlighting cognitive imperfections is certainly a step towards greater 
realism, but it is hardly enough to assume that our cognitively impaired 
actors are all incurable egoists.  Public choice theory is one area that 
changes considerably if we scrap the assumption of selfishness. 
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